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EQUITABLE MooTNEsS:
IGNORANCE IS BLISS AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Robert Miller,
ABSTRACT

Even as other prudentiallimitations losefavor, equitable mootness continues to
thrive. Its popularityderivesfrom practicalconsiderations:it protects thirdparties
who have relied upon transactions approved by the bankruptcy court from the
perceivedunfairness wrought by reversal on appeal. In spite of its merit, equitable
mootness lacks not only a statutory foundation but it also unconstitutionally
extinguishes an appellant's right to an adjudicationon the merits by an Article III
judge. Recent Supreme Court opinions have tied the constitutionality of today's
bankruptcyjudge adjudicationsand appeals to the traditionalboundaries of such
matters at common law and under the 1800 Bankruptcy Act. Because bankruptcy
judgments were historically subject to appellate review, eliminating the modern
analog based solely upon prudence violates an appellant's constitutional rights.
Rather than continue to apply equitable mootness, courts should retreat to its
origins, the stay of ajudgment pending appeal. Expanding the stay pending appeal
test to consider the raison d'etre for equitable mootness, the unfairness to third
parties wrought by reversal, weighs this concern in a constitutionalpackage.

'Partner at Manier & Herod, P.C. All the views exprcssed, and mistakes made herein are the author's
own. Many thanks to Professors Steven Lubben and Christopher Frost, as well as Charlie Shelton, for
their thoughtful comments. This Article is dedicated to my son, Everett P. Miller.
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INTRODUCION

To safeguard the balance created by the separation of powers among the three
branches of government, courts should exercise their statutory jurisdiction to the
furthest extent.2 Paradoxically, judges have self-imposed limitations on their
authority. These prudential limitations' allow unelected tribunals to punt on matters
that the elected branches have expressly given them a duty to decide.! Recent
Supreme Court jurisprudence has rightly condemned prudential limitations.'
Nonetheless, prudential limitations peculiar to bankruptcy frequently limit parties'
appellate rights.' One of these limitations is equitable mootness.
Equitable mootness eliminates a litigant's appellate rights without any
consideration of the merits of its appeal, if reversing complex court-approved
transactions' is inequitable.' Supporters of the doctrine cite a number of policy bases
as support for the doctrine including the difficulty of undoing complex transactions,
the promotion of finality in order for debtors to consummate transactions necessary
for reorganizations, and the importance of protecting third parties' reliance interests
in such transactions.' Without equitable mootness, courts have questioned whether
"any complex plan would be consummated until all appeals are terminated."'0

Although such statements may be hyperbolic, eliminating equitable mootness would
alter the parties' relative strengths and leverage points. Certainly, debtors' bargaining
power would be weakened because third parties would price-in a greater risk of a
successful appeal into the cost of the transaction. Third parties might also be less
willing to conduct business with the debtor if the specter of a reversal looms larger."

2 See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996) (citing
Colo. River Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 821 (1976); and then citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat) 264,404 (1821).
'See generallyFred 0. Smith, Jr., UndemocraticRestraint, 70 VAND. L REv. 845 (2017) (discussing
democratic concerns raised by prudential limitations).
4
See Ochadleus v. City of Detroit (In ra City of Detroit), 838 F.3d 792, 800 (6th Cir. 2016). See
generally, Smith, Jr., supra note 3.
'See, e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct 2334, 2347 (2014); Lcxmark Int'l, Inc. v.
Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 125-26 (2014).
6ITese limitations include the doctrine of equitable mootness discussed in this Article as well as the
person aggrieved standard for standing to appeal. Although both doctrines originated in bankruptcy, the
obvious parallels between bankruptcy and receivership proceedings have led to their application to
receivership appeals. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Consultants, LLC, 397 F.3d 733, 746 (9th Cir. 2005)
(applying equitable mootness to receivership appeal of receiver's plan); Fid. Bank, Nat'1 Ass'n v. M.M.
Grp., Inc., 77 F.3d 880, 882 (6th Cir. 1996) (applying person aggrieved doctrine to appellate standing in
receivership proceeding).
' Although the doctrine of equitable mootness is most commonly applied in the context of appeals of
the confirmation of plans of reorganization, it has also been applied regarding appeals ofthe confirmation
of liquidating plans, "settlements, injunctive relief, leave to file untimely proofs of claim, class
certification, property rights, asset sales, [] payment of prepetition wages[,] ... [and] financing orders."
In re Arcapita Bank B.S.C.(C), Nos. 13 Civ. 5755(SAS), 13 Civ. 5756(SAS), 2014 WL 46552, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6,2014). The Article uses the terms plan and transaction interchangeably.
"In re Transwest Resort Props., Inc., 801 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2015).
'In re Tribune Media Co., 799 F.3d 272,279 (3d Cir. 2015).
'0 Id at 288.
" See Burchinal v. Cent. Wash. Bank (In re Adams Apple, Inc.), 829 F.2d 1484, 1488 (9th Cir. 1987).
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Meanwhile, appellants' holdup power would be amplified as a party with a plausible
appeal could cloud a debtor's emergence from bankruptcy for many years until either
2
all appeals are exhausted or an extortionate settlement is extracted.1 To be sure, the
complexity inherent in many bankruptcy transactions combined with the impact on
third parties and debtors can make the effects of reversal appear inequitable.
For a number of reasons, the popularity of equitable mootness appears poised to
increase. First, as the size of corporate groups grows, so does the complexity of the
accompanying restructurings and the number of third parties relying upon the
restructuring. Courts will be ever more cognizant of the difficulty to equitably
unscramble these transactions. Second, there are minimal downside risks for
requesting a dismissal based on equitable mootness. In the context of a mega
bankruptcy case, the cost of asserting equitable mootness is miniscule compared to
the benefits if the appeal is dismissed. Third, the Supreme Court has refused to grant
certiorari to evaluate the doctrine" while the Courts of Appeals have unanimously
applied it. " Fourth, it has been expanded outside of its original application in chapter
11 cases to chapter 7," chapter 9,16 chapter 13,"' 11 U.S.C. § 304 (the predecessor
to chapter 15) casesS and receivership cases." Further expansion is possible as
parties are now requesting the equitable mootness be applied outside of the
insolvency cases.20
Although the merits and popularity of equitable mootness are obvious, problems
beset the doctrine. In spite of Courts ofAppeals' admonitions that the doctrine should
only be applied cautiously, "district courts have continued to invoke the doctrine in
modest, non-complex bankruptcies and where appellants have sought limited

12

in re Tribune Media, 799 F.3d at 288-89 (Ambro, J., concurring).
" See, e.g., Ochadleus v. City of Detroit (In re City of Detroit), 838 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2016), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 1584 (2017), cert. denied sub nom, Quinn v. City of Detroit, 137 S. Ct. 2270 (2017);
In re Tribune Media, 799 F.3d 272, cert. denied sub non, Aurelius Capital Mgmt, L.P. v. Tribune Media
Co., 136 S. Ct. 1459 (2016).
1 See In re Tribune Media, 799 F.3d at 285. All the circuits except the Federal Circuit (which does
not hear bankruptcy appeals) have at least recognized equitable mootness in some form, while of these,
the Eighth Circuit is the only one that has yet to recognize it in a published opinion. See Briggs v. LaBarge
(In re McGregory), 223 F. App'x. 530, 531 (8th Cir. 2007); Briggs v. LaBarge (In re Smith), 209 F. App'x.
607, 607-08 (8th Cir. 2006).
" Stokes v. Gardner, 483 F. App'x. 345, 346 (9th Cir. 2012); see also In re Nica Holdings, Inc., 810
F.3d 781, 786 n.4 (llth Cir. 2015) ("assum[ing] without deciding" that equitable mootness is applicable
in chapter 7).
16
Bennett v. Jefferson Cty., 899 F.3d 1240, 1251 (1 Ith Cir. 2018); In re City ofDetroit, 838 F.3d at
804-05; In re City of Vallejo, 551 F. App'x 339, 339 (9th Cir. 2013); In re City of Stockton, 542 B.R.
261, 274 (BAP 9th Cir. 2015); Alexander v. Barnwell Cty. Hosp., 498 B.R. 550, 560 (D.S.C. 2013).
'7 Walker v. Grigsby, Civil Action No. AW-06-62, 2006 WL 4877450, at *5 (Bankr. D. Md. Apr.
11,2006).
' 8 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 174 B.R. 884, 885-86, 890-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
"S.E.C. v. Capital Consultants, LLC, 397 F.3d 733, 746 (9th Cir. 2005); see S.E.C. v. Wealth Mgmt
LLC, 628 F.3d 323, 332 (7th Cir. 2010) (recognizing the possibility of applying equitable mootness but
determining the appeal on the merits).
" See United States v. Par. Chem. Co., No. 17-4192, 2019 WL 81978, at *5 (10th Cir. Jan. 3, 2019)
(appellees requested the court apply equitable mootness to sale of property pursuant Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) lien but Court of Appeals
determined appeal on the merits).
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relief" 2' Just as troubling, the frequent appeals of equitable mootness
determinations, often followed by remands to the district courts for merits
determinations, 22 undermine its promise of finality.' Seeking to buttress their
authority, some courts have attempted to tether equitable mootness to the provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code, 24 but none exist. 25 This lack of statutory basis is not just an
academic problem; it leaves courts without an anchor for the inquiry itself Lacking
express guidance, courts apply different factors with different weights-leading to
different results depending upon the venue. In spite of these problems, courts almost
unanimously uphold it against challenges. Only recently have judges questioned its
current formulation as arbitrary, unconstitutional, and inefficient. 26
Courts applying equitable mootness substitute their own views on the relative
importance of the appellant's rights compared to third parties'-a prudential
decision. This decision is made without considering the merits. 27 The separation of
powers concerns are obvious. In recently limiting the application of prudential
standing, the Supreme Court explained that "[j]ust as a court cannot apply its
independent policy judgment to recognize a cause of action that Congress has denied,
.. . it cannot limit a cause of action that Congress has created merely because
'prudence' dictates."" Substitute "appellate right" for "cause of action" and the
problems created by the doctrine of equitable mootness crystalize.
This Article explores the newest critique of equitable mootness: its violation of
Article [I of the Constitution. Equitable mootness is constitutionally questionable
because it denies appellants' right to an appeal on the merits by an Article [LI judge.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly suggested that the constitutionality ofbankruptcy
adjudications depends upon the historical treatment of such matters at common law

21 In re One2One Commc'ns, LLC, 805 F3d 428, 438-39 (3d Cir. 2015) (Krause,
J., concurring);
see also id at 439 ("Since Continental Airlines, we have reversed findings of equitable mootness or
declined to dismiss appeals as equitably moot no less than seven times."). Some may posit that the
willingness of district court judges to apply equitable mootness stems from their desire to dispose of
bankruptcy appeals as quickly as possible. See Troy A. McKenzie, JudicialIndependence, Autonomy, and
the Bankruptcy Courts, 62 STAN. L. REv. 747, 791-92 (2010) (examining disinclination of Article III
judges to adjudicate bankruptcy matters).
' This Article will assume that the appeal from the bankruptcy court was made to a district court
rather than a bankruptcy appellate panel.
2 In re One2One, 805 F.3d at 446-47 (Krause, J., concurring).
21
See In re UNR Indus., Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 1994).
* Although few provisions of the Bankruptcy Code concem appeals, 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) and 11
U.S.C. § 364(e) limit the effect of appellate reversals in certain situations. As explained in Part III of this
Article, the enactment of these provisions but not a similar provision providing for equitable mootness
suggests Congress did not intend for equitable mootness to exist
' See, e.g., Ochadleus v. City of Detroit (In re City of Detroit), 838 F.3d 792, 805-06 (6th Cir. 2016)
(Moore, J., dissenting); In re One2One, 805 F.3d at 443-46 (Krause, J., concurring).
' See In re Cont'l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 567 (3d. Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting) ("The majority
adopts the curious doctrine of 'equitablc mootness,' which it interprets as permitting federal district courts
and courts of appeals to refuse to entertain the merits of live bankruptcy appeals over which they
indisputably possess statutory jurisdiction and in which they can plainly provide relief.").
' Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct 1377, 1388 (2014).

274

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 107

and federal law contemporaneous with the Framing ofthe Constitution." In the case
of a bankruptcy appeal, Congress would need to provide appellate rights at least as
extensive as the rights to appeal the bankruptcy commissioners' orders to the
Chancellor and the district courts under the 1800 Act.3 o Based upon this strong
historical precedent, the right to appeal from a final order by a bankruptcy judge to
an Article III judge is a constitutionally protected right. Equitable mootness
eliminates this right and leaves appellants without their constitutionally required
determination by an Article III judge.'
In spite of these critiques, the policy underlying equitable mootness-the
inequity of reversal on third parties who relied upon a restructuring transaction-is
a fundamental concern for a functioning corporate bankruptcy regime. 32 A better
option for supporting this policy is to add it to the analysis ofthe stay pending appeal.
The link between equitable mootness and stay pending appeal is already strong.
Whether a stay pending appeal was sought is the historical genesis of equitable
34
mootness.33 More recently, courts have gravitated back to this original focus.
Adoption of an expanded stay pending appeal test would complete this transition.
The momentum in favor of an expanded stay pending appeal test is deserved. By
considering the interests of non-parties affected by a reversal, the policy concerns
supporting equitable mootness are addressed while the critiques of equitable
mootness are inapplicable. Granted, the stay pending appeal does not provide the
same protection to appellees as equitable mootness. Lesser protection
constitutionally applied is normatively preferable to greater protection available
from an unconstitutional doctrine.

" See, e.g., Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1951 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting); id at 1970 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 483-84 (2011);
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 43-46 (1989); N. Pipeline Constr. Co v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,90 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
3 See Wellness Int'l, 135 S. Ct at 1970 (Thomas, J., dissenting); James E. Pfander, Article I
Tribunals, Article III Courtsand The JudicialPower of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REv. 643, 721,
729 (2004); John A. E. Pottow & Jason S. Levin, RethinkingCriminalContempt in the BankruptcyCourts,
91 AM. BANKR. LJ. 311, 323 (2017) (arguing that decisions of commissioners were subject to
confirmation by Chancellor or the law courts).
3' See In re City of Detroit, 838 F.3d 79 at 811-12 (Moore, J., dissenting); In re One2One, 805 F.3d
at 444 & n. 10 (Krause, J., concurring).
3 In this way, equitable mootness is quite similar to third party releases. Just like equitable mootness,
third party releases are viewed as necessary to facilitate complex bankruptcy cases, SEC v. Drexel
Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc.), 960 F.2d 285, 293 (2d Cir.
1992), while they lack statutory support, Inre SunEdison, Inc., 576 B.R. 453,462 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017);
In re Transit Grp., Inc., 286 B.R 811, 815-16 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002) and are constitutionally
questionable based on Article III, see In re Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC, 242 F. Supp. 3d 322, 339
(D. Del. 2017) (asserting that third party releases covering common law claims likely abridge right to a
final judgment by an Article Ill judge because they tantamount to final judgments entered by a bankruptcy
judge).
33 See infra PartII.
' See e.g., Motor Vehicle Cas. Co. v. Thorpe Insulation Co. (In re Thorpe Insulation Co.), 677 F.3d
869, 881 (9th Cir. 2012); Carrega v. Grubb & Ellis Co. (In re Grubb & Ellis Co.), 523 B.R. 423, 441
(S.D.N.Y. 2014); RM 18 Corp. v. Aztex Assocs., L.P. (In re Malese 18 Corp.), 426 B.R. 44,49 (E.D.N.Y.
2010)
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This solution is not pie in the sky. The four-factor test for a stay pending appeal
under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 80073- is a product of traditional
judicial gloss. 3" Although the Supreme Court has confirmed the four factors, it has
not delineated the exact boundaries of the factors because they "contemplate
individualized judgments in each case." 3 ' This flexibility leaves room for the
modified test for bankruptcy appeals. The third factor in the traditional test is
"whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in
the proceeding." 3 1 When a stay pending appeal is sought in a bankruptcy case, this
factor should consider non-parties to the appeal who could be injured by reversal.
Some courts have already considered the effect on non-appellee creditors as part of
the stay pending appeal inquiry.3 9
This Article will proceed by first canvassing the various justiciability doctrines
and their intersection with stays pending appeal. Next, it summarizes history of
equitable mootness starting with its pre-Bankruptcy Code origins and then overviews
the current status of equitable mootness across the courts of appeal. It then analyzes
the various critiques of equitable mootness while focusing on its violation of Article
III, which has not been evaluated prior to this Article. To conclude, this Article will
argue for altering the stay pending appeal standard to include the concerns central to
equitable mootness. This solution incorporates the concerns supporting equitable
mootness but repackages them in a form that is fairer, unquestionably constitutional,
and supported by the relevant statute.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL MOOTNESS AND STAY PENDING APPEAL

Before there was equitable mootness, there was constitutional mootness and an
appellant's right to seek a stay pending appeaL Surveying the latter two is necessary
to understanding the first. Article I of the Constitution limits federal courts to
adjudicating only live cases and controversies.o This is true at not only the trial court
level but at all stages of appellate review."' Constitutional mootness is among the
prudential doctrines created by judges to ensure the live case and controversy
requirement is met.42 A court inquires whether further proceedings can affect the

3

FED. R. BANKR. P. 8007.
' See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009) (discussing the traditional principles involved in a
decision to grant a stay pending appeal).
"Id at 433-34 (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 777 (1987)).
3
Jd at 434 (quoting Hilton, 481 U.S. at 776). Other courts compared the injury to the appellant if
the order is not stayed to the injury to the appellee ifthe stay is granted, a "balance ofthe hardships." E.g.
In re Gardens Reg'I Hosp. and Mod. Cntr., Inc., 567 B.R. 820, 832 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2017).
" See, e.g., In re Alpha Nat Res., Inc., 556 B.R. 249,264 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2016); In re W.R. Grace
& Co., 475 B.R. 34,208 (D. Del. 2012); In re Williamson, 414 B.R. 892, 895 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2009); In
re Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 221 B.R. 881, 885 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997).
SSee U.S. CONST., art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18,
20-21 (1994); Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472,477 (1990).
4 U.& Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 21; Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477.
4
The other best-known limitations are ripeness, standing, the political question doctrine and the
prohibition on advisory opinions. Keitel v. Mazurkiewicz, 729 F.3d 278,280 (3d Cir. 2013).
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subject matter of the proceeding."3 When an event occurs rendering it impossible for
a court to grant any effective relief the case becomes moot and it must be dismissed
without the merits being heard." No controversy exists when no effective relief can
be granted.` This is true no matter the stakes. To wit, the Supreme Court dismissed
the appeal of the Section 363 sale of Chrysler's assets because the appeal was moot."
While justice imposed by Constitutional mootness may seem rough, it is mitigated
by the narrowness of its application. It only arises when no effective relief can be
fashioned 47 If some effective relief is possible, the appeal is not moot, and it should
4
proceed. 8
Constitutional mootness often arises when actions approved by a trial court are
consummated and the remedy sought by the appellant becomes either impossible or
impracticable to obtain.' One way for an appellant to forestall this fate is to obtain
a stay pending appeal. 0 If an appellant successfully obtains a stay, the status quo
will be preserved along with the appellant's opportunity to obtain a remedy." Rule
8 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and its analog, Rule 8007 of the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, govern the process of obtaining a stay of a
judgment or order." Ordinarily, both require the initial motion to be brought at the
trial court level-district court for Rule 8" and bankruptcy court for the Rule 8007."
Upon the trial court's determination on a stay motion, the appellant may petition the
appellate court to modify or vacate the trial court's order" or even petition the circuit
justice for a stay.'

" Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895).
"Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (citing Mills, 159 U.S. at 653).
Constitutional mootness may be raised sua sponte. Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049, 1053-54 & n.3
(I llth Cir. 2003) (holding that, because mootness "strik[es] at the heart of federal subject matter
jurisdiction" it may be raised sua sponte) (quoting Sannon v. United States, 631 F.2d 1247, 1250 (5th Cir.
1980)).
45
See Mills, 159 U.S. at 653.
* See Ind. State Police Pension Tr. v. Chrysler LLC, 558 U.S. 1087 (2009) (per curiam) (granting
cert. but ordering lower court to dismiss appeal regarding sale of substantially all the assets of automaker
Chrysler LLC); Ind. State Police Pension Tr. v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chyrsler LLC), 576 F3d 108, 112
(2d Cir. 2009).
' 7 Church ofScientology, 506 U.S. at 12-13.
' Id at 12-14; see also Golfland Ent. Ctrs., Inc. v. Peak Inv., Inc. (In re BCD Corp.), 119 F.3d 852,
856 (10th Cir. 1997); Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Swedeland Dev. Grp., Inc. (In re Swedeland Dev. Grp.,
Inc.) 16 F.3d 552, 560 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc).
49 See Sullivan Cent. Plaza, I, Ltd. V. BancBoston Real Estate Capital Corp. (In re Sullivan Cent.
Plaza, I, Ltd.), 914 F.2d 731, 733 (5th Cir. 1990).
5
Jd
" See Veasey v. Abbott, 870 F.3d 387, 392 (5th Cir. 2017).
- FED. R. APP. P. 8; FEu. R. BANKR. P. 8007.
53
FE. R. ApP. P. 8.
SFED. R. BANKR. P. 8007.
5 This is the Court of the Appeals in the case of an appeal from the district court sitting as a trial
court FED. R. APP. P. 8. In a bankruptcy case, it could be the district court, bankruptcy appellate panel or
even the court of appeals if a direct appeal is sought See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8007(b).
' See Motor Vehicle Cas. Co. v. Thorpe Insulation Co. (In re Thorpe Insulation Co.), 677 F.3d 869,
881 (9th Cir. 2012); In re Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers Local Union # 107, 888 F.2d 293, 297 (3d
Cir. 1989) (citing In re Roberts Farms, Inc., 652 F.2d 793, 798 (9th Cir. 1981)). Supreme Court Rule 23
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Because a proponent often seeks to quickly consummate a restructuring
transaction following bankruptcy court approval," it may be imperative to obtain a
stay pending appeal to protect against constitutional mootness." A paradigm
example is the sale of securities following confirmation of a plan of reorganization?
The debtor-issuer will attempt to sell its securities as soon as possible after
confirmation in order to raise cash to make payments under the plan.' If a stay is not
obtained, the prevailing party may treat the bankruptcy court's order as final and
consummate the transactions contemplated by the confirmed plan." Without a stay,
there may be no possible relief available to appellant (Le. constitutional mootness)
due to an inability to undo consummated transactions. 62
Given the severity of constitutional mootness, the opportunity for an appellant to
obtain a stay is a foundational component of the federal appellate system. Indeed,
that, as part of its traditional equipment for the
"[i]t has always been held ...
administration of justice, a federal court can stay the enforcement of a judgment
pending the outcome of an appeal." 3 An appellant's request for a stay pending
appeal requires a balancing of interests. On the one hand, the power to grant a stay
pending appeal can protect against irreparable harm resulting from the enforcement
of a judgment prior to its reversal (such as constitutional mootness)." On the other
hand, any stay must also provide sufficient protection to the appellee against losses
resulting from the stay if the appellate court confirms the lower court's judgment.6 1
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8007, the rule governing the process of
obtaining a stay pending appeal from a bankruptcy court order, reflects this

governs requests for stay from a circuit justice. See Frommert v. Conkright, 639 F. Supp. 2d 305, 312-13
(W.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306,1308 (1980) (Brenan, J., in chambers)). On
at least one occasion, a circuit justice has stayed the implementation of a plan of reorganization. In re
Equitable Office Bldg. Corp., 72 S. Ct 1086, 1087, 1090 (1946) (Reed, J., in chambers).
' Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 6004(h) provides that an order allowing a debtor to use, sell
or lease property is stayed for 14 days, which provides an opportunity to seek a longer stay or an expedited
appeal. See Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Old Cold LLC, (In re Old Cold LLC), 879 F.3d 376, 387 (1st
Cir. 2018). It also expressly allows a court to waive the stay when there is a sufficient business necessity
to dose the transaction. Id; In re Boscov's, Inc., No. 08-11637(KG), 2008 WL 4975882, at *2 (Bankr.
D. Del. Nov. 21, 2008).
m See In re Highway Truck DriwrsLocal Union, 888 F.2d at 298 ("[Iln addition to those situations

covered under 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) and § 364(e), a myriad of circumstances can occur that would
necessitate the grant of a stay pending appeal in order to preserve a party's position"); Lawrence v. Revere
Copper and Brass Inc. (In re Revere Cooper & Brass Inc.), 78 B.R. 17, 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("[lIt is
"'obligatory" upon an appellant from a confirmation order to "pursue with diligence all available remedies
to obtain a stay" of the implementation of that order prior to the occurrence of comprehensive changes
made in reliance on the unstayed order.'") (quoting In re Roberts Farms, 652 F.2d at 798).
" See, e.g., In re Peabody Energy Corp., 582 B.R. 771, 775-76 (E.D. Mo. 2017).
6 See id
61 In re Toc Assocs., L.P., Civ A. Nos. 92-6788, 92-6772, 92-6773, 92-6775, Bankruptcy No.
91-23375T, 1993 WL 276993, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 1993).
' See n re St Johnsbury Trucking Co., Inc., 185 B.R. 687, 689-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
' Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 9-10 (1942) (footnote omitted). Indeed, the first
Judiciary Act of 1789 contemplated an appellant's ability to obtain a writ of supersodeas and stay of
execution. Id at 10 n.4; see also Slaughter-house Cases, 77 U.S. 273, 275 (1869).
"Scripps-Howard Radio, 316 U.S. at 9; see alsoNken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418,427 (2009).
' Athridge v. Iglesias, 464 F. Supp. 2d 19, 23 (D.D.C. 2006).
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balance." This rule gives an appellant the option of either posting a supersedeas
bond or moving for a stay pending appeal 7 The first option ensures the appellant
obtains a stay. A supersedeasbond is a bond that it is issued in an amount set by the
court as sufficient to guarantee an appellee full recovery on its judgment if the
appellant is unsuccessful on appeal." Because the appellee is protected from harm
when a supersedeasbond is posted, it effectuates a stay as a matter of right. 69 Many
appellants either cannot post or choose not to post a supersedeas bond and try to

obtain a stay without posting a bond."o Indeed, a complex bankruptcy plan can
involve transactions with assets or equity value in the billions, without even
considering the administrative expenses accruing every month. As a result, the
associated supersedeas bond could also be in the billions." Faced with such an
onerous burden, appellants often argue a bond is unnecessary.'
Another way to conceptualize a motion for a stay pending appeal is by comparing
it to its brethren, the motion for a preliminary injunction. The parallels are strong as
"[b]oth can have the practical efTect of preventing some action before the legality of
that action has been conclusively determined."" A preliminary injunction directs a
party's course of conduct prior to a determination on the merits related to the
conduct.' A stay pending appeal halts the effect of an entry of an order while an
appeal is heard on the merits ofthe order.75 Given these similarities, it is unsurprising
that the test for stay pending appeal and the test for a preliminary injunction are

substantially similar.7 6 Both also place the burden of persuasion on the party seeking
the keep the status quo;" these burdens are heavy because they seek extraordinary

" Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8007 is the analog to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Credit One Bank, NA. v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 560 B.R. 84,88 n.4 (S.D.N.Y.
2016).
67 FED. R. BANKR. P. 8007.
"N. River Ins. Co. v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 895 F. Supp. 83, 84 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
' Frommert v. Conkright, 639 F. Supp. 2d 305,308 (W.D.N.Y. 2009).
a See, e.g., id at 307.
71
See, e.g., In re Tribune Co., 477 B.R. 465, 478-80 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012). This is particularly true
when the value of the estate could be diminished by the stay. See ACC Bondholder Corp. v. Adelphia
Commc'ns Corp. (In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp.), 361 B.R. 337, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). A party could
appeal the amount of the bond as unreasonably high, however, an argument that the bond is prohibitively
high without asserting a lower amount is still reasonable is unlikely to be successful. See In re Tribune
Media Co., 799 F.3d 272, 276 (3d Cir. 2015).
' See, e.g., id.
7 Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 428 (2009); see also In re Convenience USA, Inc., 290 B.R. 558,
561 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2003) ("A motion for a stay pending appeal in a sense seeks injunctive relief
because the movant is asking that an event be halted, i.e., that the court order that ajudgment or order not
go into effect.").
74
Nken, 556 U.S. at 428.
' Id at 428-29 (2009). The Supreme Court distinguished between an injunction that is a "judicial
process or mandate operating in personam" compared to a stay that "operates upon the judicial proceeding
itself." Id at 428.
"In re Convenience USA,290 B.R. at 561.
" Nken, 556 U.S. at 427.
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relief "intru[ding] into the ordinary processes of administration and judicial
review.""
The test for stay pending appeal in a bankruptcy case does not differ from a
typical civil case. Both apply a four-factor test:
(1) [W]hether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is
likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be
irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will
substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4)
where the public interest lies. 9
Tradition, as confirmed by the Supreme Court's opinion in Nken v. Holder,
classifies the first two factors as the most important.so Moreover, an appellant must
show more than a "possibility of relief' to satisfy the first factor and more than a
possibility of irreparable injury to satisfy the second factor."' Beyond this guidance,
the Supreme Court encouraged judicial discretion to make individualized
determinations based upon each case's factual circumstance.8
II. EVOLUTION OF EQUITABLE MOOTNESS
Equitable mootness is a prudential limitation applied by appellate judges to
dismiss an underlying appeal without even considering the merits.8 3 This section
explores the policy underpinnings and origins of this powerful doctrine.
Although prudential limitations are often applied in bankruptcy appeals, such
limitations undermine the obligation of federal courts to exercise their jurisdiction
fully. As Chief Justice Marshall admonished, a court has "no more right to decline

at 433-34.
9 Compare Id at 422, 433-34, 436 (discussing a stay of an alien removal appeal), with United Mine
Workers of Am. Combined Benefit Fund v. Walter Energy, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-00064-RDP, 2016 WL
470815, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 8,2016), appealdismissed(Apr. 4,2016) (discussing a stay ofa bankruptcy
appeal).
0Nken, 556 U.S. at 434.
8Id

SlId

at 434-35.

n Id at 433-34. Among the unresolved issues concerning the test is whether a movant must satisfy
all four factors or ifa strong showing on one or both of the first two is sufficient The Third Circuit, in the
context of a bankruptcy appeal, adopted a sliding scale approach whereby a sufficient showing on the
merits and irreparable harm triggers a balancing among the four factors. In re Revel AC, Inc., 802 F.3d
558, 569-71 (3d Cir. 2015). This sliding scale approach has been rejected by other courts. See id at
576-77 & n.3 (Schwartz, J., dissenting).
' Ochadleus v. City of Detroit (In re City of Detroit 838 F.3d 792, 798 (6th Cir. 2016). There are
rare situations when a bankruptcy court will apply equitable mootness in a situation outside of an appeal
such as a motion to dismiss an adversary proceeding seeking to revoke a chapter II plan confirmation.
See, e.g., Almeroth v. Innovative Clinical Solutions, Ltd. (In re Innovative Clinical Solutions, Ltd.), 302
B.R. 136, 140-41 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003). In any event, unlike constitutional mootness, which may be
found sua sponte, a motion to dismiss is necessary for the application of equitable mootness. See Minerals
Techs., Inc. v. Novinda Corp. (In re Novinda Corp.), 585 B.R. 145, 152 (B.A.P 10th Cir. 2018) (stating
that the court declined to rule on the equitable mootness claim due to the lack of a motion to dismiss).
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the exercise ofjurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.""4
If a federal court possesses jurisdiction, its "obligation" to hear and decide a case is
"virtually unflagging.-"" In spite of this guidance, prudential limitations often
foreclose parties' rights to appeal the merits of a judgment by a bankruptcy court."
One may correctly assume the policy foundations of equitable mootness are strong.
The paramount policy concern reflected by equitable mootness is the protection
of third parties' interests who are not participating in the bankruptcy appeal."
Prejudice to third-parties from a reversal on appeal can always arise, but the
multiplicity of parties affected by an appeal in a bankruptcy case amplifies this
issue.' Unlike the principal parties to a bankruptcy case, who will be aware of the
appeal and can ascertain its potential effects, a less sophisticated vendor or customer
may suffer from an information asymmetry and simply learn that the transaction was
approved without understanding the risks associated with an appeal. Equitable
mootness can mitigate the unfairness to third parties who may not even know that a
debtor's very existence hinges upon the fate of appeaL"
Equitable mootness is also derived from the importance of finality to bankruptcy
proceedings. Finality is vital to restoring third parties' confidence in a debtor and
allowing it to successfully emerge from bankruptcy." The greater the chance the
transactions will be undone, the less money parties may be willing to pay for the
debtor's securities or assets-a knock-on effect with the potential to endanger the
viability of the debtor's reorganization." In contrast, when third parties are confident
transactions will not be overturned, they will offer the debtor better commercial
terms (less risk to price in) and be generally more interested in transacting with the
debtor. Writ large, this can improve debtor's prospects to reorganize and emerge
from bankruptcy.' Even though this Article is critical of the doctrine of equitable
mootness and argues for its elimination, these policy concerns are worthy of

T

Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,404 (1821).
* Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S., 69, 77 (2013) (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation
Dist. V. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)).
' Non-coincidentally, many of the same criticisms of equitable mootness listed in this Article also
apply to the person aggrieved doctrine and, just like equitable mootness, the person aggrieved doctrine
has not been confirmed by the Supreme Court For a summary of the person aggrieved doctrine, consider,
S. Todd Brown, Non-PecuniaryInterestsand the InudiciousLimits ofAppellate Standingin Bankryutcy,
59 BAYLOR L REv. 569 (2007).
57
See In re UNR Indust Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 769-70 (7th Cir. 1994).
See In re Tri-State Bldg. MaterialsCo., 279 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (D.S.D. 1968) (noting multiplicity
of ill-informed parties often exist in a bankruptcy case).
" See Grimes v. Genesis Health Ventures, Inc. (In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc.), 280 B.R. 339,
345-46 (D. Del. 2002) (explaining that a notice of appeal may not be sufficient notice to investors of the
possibility of reversal).
" Rochman v. Ne. Utils. Serv. Grp. (In re Pub. Serv. Co.), 963 F.2d 469,471-72 (1st Cir. 1992).
9' See In re UNR Indust, 20 F.3d at 770; see also In re City ofDetroit, 838 F.3d at 798. In a similar
law and cconomics vein, the allocation ofthe debtor's assets may also be distorted in favor of parties who
are less sensitive to risk of reversal and against those parties who can make the highest and best use of
such assets. See In re UNR Indust, 20 F.3d at 770.
* See In re UNR Indust, 20 F.3d at 770; R. Jake Jumbeck, Comment, "Complexity" as the
Gatekeeper for Equitable Mooiness, 33 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 171, 172-73 (2016).
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protection. The expanded stay pending appeal test suggested by this Article
incorporates these concerns.
Equitable mootness evolved from the application of the constitutional mootness
doctrine caused by failures to obtain stays pending appeals. As early as the 1898
Bankruptcy Act, courts recognized the potential for constitutional mootness arising
from the unstayed issuance ofpublic securities to third parties or sales of property to
good faith purchasers.' In 1976, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy 805 was amended to
codify existing law whereby "the sale to a good faith purchaser or the issuance of a
certificate to a good faith holder shall not be affected by the reversal or modification
of such order on appeal, whether or not the purchaser or holder knows of the
pendency of the appeal." An appellant could avoid the statutory mootness arising
from Rule 805 by obtaining a stay pending appeal.9 s
Two Ninth Circuit decisions form the foundation of equitable mootness by
moving beyond the traditional notions of mootness in order to rectify the inequity
of reversal on third parties. In Valley National Bank of Arizona v. Trustee of
Westgate-Calfornia Corp., the appellants sought to reverse a merger between a
public subsidiary of the debtor and another subsidiary." The entities had
consummated the merger following approval by the bankruptcy court and all of the
public entities' shares were either redeemed or exchanged for shares in the new
surviving entity.97 Instead of following the well-worn path of asserting the
impossibility of undoing the merger, the court detoured and stressed the inequities
of reversal. Namely, the current shareholders were not party to the appeal while the
surviving company had been operating for two years since the merger.9 Confirming
its divergence from constitutional mootness, the court found "it difficult, if not
impossible, to fashion an equitable remedy that would restore appellants to their
former positions."" Recall, a case is not constitutionally moot if the any effective
relief can be granted, regardless of difficulty. The court retained a link with the
traditional mootness analysis by requiring the appellants to have sought a stay
pending appeal in order to avoid equitable mootness.
Building on Valley, the Ninth Circuit applied equitable mootness for a second
time in In re Roberts Farms, Inc."oi The appellants, ironically two of the same parties
from the Valley case, sought to reverse a bankruptcy court's orders disallowing
claims, approving a settlement, and confirming a plan.10 2 The appellants failed
miserably to follow proper appellate procedure. They not only attempted to obtain a
stay from the district court rather than first properly applying for a stay from the

a See A & H Holding Corp. v. O'Donnell (In re Abingdon Realty Corp.), 530 F.2d 588, 590 (4th Cir.
1976); Taylor v. Austrian, 154 F2d 107, 108 (4th Cir. 1946) (per curiarn).
" See id.
9 See id.
' Valley Nat'1 Bank of Ariz. v. Tr. of Westgate-Cal. Corp. 609 F.2d 1274, 1276 (9th Cir. 1979).
97
1d at 1276.
9Id at 1283.
9 Id
101 652 F.3d 793, 798 (9th Cir. 1981).
'02

Id. at 794.
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bankruptcy judge, but they also filed a writ of mandamus with the district court in
lieu of a direct appeal. 0 3 The stay and the writ were both denied by the district
court.104 Meanwhile, the plan was consummated and transactions contemplated by
10
The court's analysis confirmed the break from
the plan were implemented.o
constitutional mootness and equitable mootness' relationship to the appellant
seeking a stay pending appeal. First, the court categorized the appeal as moot because
no stay had been obtained and the implementation of the plan could not be undone."
Second, the court relied upon the equitable mootness doctrine espoused in Valley.'o7
The court described the doctrine as arising when "the failure to seek stays coupled
with a substantial change of circumstances would justify dismissal of the appeal for
lack of equity."" The appellant's poor efforts to seek a stay allowed the
implementation of the plan and made it inequitable to reverse the transactions made
in reliance upon the plan." Immediately following the Roberts Farm opinion,
adoption of the equitable mootness was slow, but it steadily accelerated in the
1990s."o Analyses in these early cases typically parroted Roberts Farms without
adding any further rationales for the doctrine."

III. CURRENT STATUS OF EQUITABLE MOOTNESS
Judge Easterbrook's In re UNR Industries, Inc., opinion diverged from the early
articulations of equitable mootness as he highlighted why the term mootness poorly
describes the doctrine of equitable mootness and articulated a textual defense of the
doctrine." 2 Although certainly founded upon equity, mootness is an ill-chosen term
to include in the doctrine's name."' Recall, mootness refers to a court's inability to
grant relief rather than a court's unwillingness to grant relief"" Judge Easterbrook

1 0 Id. at 794-95.
'04Id at 796.
'a See id at 796-97.
10 Id at 796-98.
107Id. at 798.

"n Id. at 798. The Ninth Circuit would later reaffirm this test Salomon v. Logan (In re Int'l Envtl.
Dynamics, Inc.), 718 F.2d 322,325-26 (9th Cir. 1983).
'" In re Roberts Farms, 652 F.3d at 798.

""leDistrict of Columbia Circuit adopted the doctrine in 1986, see In re AOV Indus., Inc., 792
F.2d 1140, 1147-50 (D.C. Cir. 1986), while the Eleventh Circuit adopted the doctrine in 1988, see Miami
Cntr. Ltd. P'ship v. Bank of New York, 838 F.2d 1547, 1554-55 (1 Ith Cir. 1988). The First, Second, Fifth
and Seventh Circuits all adopted the doctrine in the early 1990s. See Manges v. Seattle-First Nat'1 Bank
(In re Manges), 29 F.3d 1034, 1039 (5th Cir. 1994); In re Chateaugay Corp., 988 F.2d 322, 325-26 (2d
Cir. 1993); In re Andreuccetti, 975 F.2d 413, 417-19 (7th Cir. 1992); Rochman v. Ne. Utils. Serv. Grp.
(In re Public Serv. Co.), 963 F.2d 469, 471-72 (1st Cir. 1992).
" See, e.g., Miami Cntr., 838 F.2d at 1554-57; In re AOVIndw., 792 F.2d at 1146-50.
"1 In re UNR Indus., Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 1994).
"3 Bennett v. Jefferson Cty., Alabama, 899 F.3d 1240, 1247 (11th Cir. 2018) ("The doctrine, then,
reference actual mootness at all.").
does not
4
" See id ("There is a big difference between inability to alter the outcome (real mootness) and
unwillingness to alter the outcome ('equitable mootness').").
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does not suffer fools."' He bluntly charged the term equitable mootness as
"misleading" and "banished" it from the Seventh Circuit."

6

Other courts have

subsequently admitted mootness may be an inapt term but have retained it due to the
frequency of its use.17
Turning to the text of the Bankruptcy Code for support of the doctrine, Judge
Easterbrook listed a number of provisions "provid[ing] that courts should keep their
hands off consummated transactions."I" Two sections, 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(m) and
364(e), "restrict the results of a reversal or modification of a bankruptcy court's order
authorizing a sale or lease" or extension of credit,"' while another, 11 U.S.C.
§ 1127(b), more generally supports the finality of plan confirmation. Section 363(m)
(the successor to Rule 805) precludes the reversal of an order authorizing the sale or
lease of estate property from affecting a transaction with a good faith purchaser or
lessor, unless the appellant obtains a stay pending appeal.' 20 The merits of the appeal
are immaterial if the purchaser or lessor acted in good faith and the appellant failed
to obtain a stay.' 2' Section 364(e), provides the same treatment for post-petition
credit extended or liens granted.1 2 2 Section 1127(b) is based upon the same
concerns as it limits a bankruptcy court's authority to modify a confirmed plan of
reorganization after it has been substantially consummated. 21 Judge Easterbrook
summarized the policy basis for these provisions as "preserving interests bought and
paid for in reliance on judicial decisions, and avoiding the pains that attend any effort
to unscramble an egg." 24 Given the importance of this policy and the examples of it
in the Code, Judge Easterbrook found it obvious that equitable mootness filled an
interstice, a gap, in the Code by allowing an appellate court to determine whether it
was "prudent"-the appropriate term given it is judge-made-to upset a plan of
reorganization or other complex transaction on appeal.1 25
Following UNR, many courts copied its analysis but still struggled to coalesce
around a single test or a group of factors to evaluate equitable mootness. The Third

"s See, e.g., In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 868 (7th Cir. 2004) (skewering bankruptcy court's
entry of critical vendor order without legal or factual analysis with the exception of "some sketchy
representations by counsel plus unhclpful testimony by Kmart's CEO").
116 In re UNRIndus., 20 F3d at 769.
" See, e.g., In re Cont'l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 559 (3d Cir. 1996).
" In re UNR Indus., 20 F.3d at 769.
" Krebs Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Valley Motors, Inc., 141 F.3d 490,499 (3d Cir. 1998).
'2 See In re UNR Indus., 20 F.3d at 769; Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc., v Old Cold LLC (In re Old
Cold LLC), 879 F.3d 376, 383 (1st Cir. 2018) ("The effect of this provision is to render statutorily moot
any appellate challenge to a sale that is both to a good faith purchaser, and not stayed.").
121 See In re Old Cold, 879 F.3d at 388 ("We need not-and do not-consider this challenge to the
propriety of the sale. As we have explained, section 363(m) applies even ifthe bankruptcy court's approval
of the sale was not proper, as long as the bankruptcy court was acting under section 363(b).").
i" See Shapiro v. Saybrook Mfg. Co. (In re Saybrook Mfg. Co.), 963 F.2d 1490, 1492-93 (11th Cir.
1992) ("The purpose of this provision is to encourage the extension of credit to debtors in bankruptcy by
eliminating the risk that any lien securing the loan will be modified on appeal.").
1- See In re UNR Indus., 20 F.3d at 769.
2 Id
125
Id
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Circuit exemplifies the uncertainty surrounding the exact composition of the test.'"
It originally adopted a five factor test for equitable mootness in In re Continental
Airlines: "(1) [W]hether the reorganization plan has been substantially
consummated, (2) whether a stay has been obtained, (3) whether the relief requested
would affect the rights of parties not before the court, (4) whether the relief requested
would affect the success of the plan, and (5) the public policy of affording finality to
bankruptcy judgments."127 The Third Circuit subsequently recognized that these
factors are too interconnected and overlapping.' 2 8 The first and second overlap
2
because substantial consummation cannot occur if a stay is successfully obtained. 1
granting
Similarly, the fourth fictor duplicates the first because "it considers whether
the appellant the requested relief would unravel the plan," a result that could not be
obtained absent substantial consummation."o Given these shortcomings, the Third
Circuit synthesized a new test: "(1) [W]hether a confirmed plan has been
substantially consummated, and (2) if so, whether granting the relief requested in the
appeal will (a) fatally scramble the plan and/or (b) significantly harm third parties
who have justifiably relied on plan confirmation."' Other circuits have embraced
different tests ranging from the three factors of the Fifth Circuit to the five factors of
the Second Circuit to the six flctors ofthe Tenth Circuit.13 2
In spite of the divergence among the circuits' tests, they generally focus on four
considerations: (i) whether the appellant sought a stay pending appeal; (ii) whether
the plan or transaction has been substantially consummated, (iii) third parties'
reliance upon the transaction or plan; and (iv) whether equitable and effective relief
can be granted to the appellant."' Each factor is worthy of further examination.
A. Stay PendingAppeal
Although seeking a stay pending appeal is neither strictly necessary nor sufficient
to preclude equitable mootness,' ' diligently seeking a stay makes the appellate court
much less likely to conclude a matter is equitably moot.135 The importance of this

12 The Third Circuit enjoys preeminence as the appellate court for appeals from the District of
Delaware where an outsized number of large and complex (read candidates for equitable mootness)
bankruptcy cases are filed and, as a result courts outside of the circuit will often rely on its rulings.
'DInre Cont'1 Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 560 (3d Cir. 1996).
InSee
In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 690 F.3d 161, 168-69 (3d Cir. 2012).
2
' 9Id at 169.
'" Samson Energy Res., Co. v Semcrude, L.P. (In re Semcrude, LP.), 728 F.3d 314, 321 (3d Cir.
2013).

'"Compare Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. v. Jubber (In re Paige), 584 F.3d 1327, 1339 (10th Cir. 2009)
with Wooley v. Faulkner (In re SI Restructuring, Inc.), 542 F.3d 131, 136 (5th Cir. 2008), and In re BGI,
Inc., 772 F.3d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 2005).
' See, e.g., Mac Panel Co. v. Va. Panel Corp., 283 F.3d 622, 625 (4th Cir. 2002); Olympic Coast
Inv., Inc. v. Crum (In re Wright), Nos. MT-08-1164-MoDH, 05-61714,2008 WL 8462954, at *4 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. Nov. 3, 2008).
'3 Ochadleus v Detroit (In re City of Detroit), 838 F.3d 792, 798-99 (6th Cir. 2016).

'"See JPMCC 2007-Cl Grasslawn Lodging, LLC v. Transwest Resort Props. Inc. (In re Transwest
Resort Props., Inc.), 801 F.3d 1161, 1168 (9th Cir. 2015).
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factor dates back to the Roberts Farm case and the origins of equitable mootness.' 36
A failure to seek a stay pending appeal from each available court, including the
Circuit Justice, increases the likelihood of equitable mootness.i` Even though a
failure to request a stay and a denied request have the same result,13 s failure to
diligently attempt to obtain a stay weighs more heavily in favor of equitable
mootness.13

9

B. Substantial Consummation
Unlike the other factors, substantial consummation is defined by the Bankruptcy
Code. It occurs when a three part test is satisfied.
(A) [T]ransfer of all or substantially all of the property proposed by
the plan to be transferred; (B) assumption by the debtor or by the successor
to the debtor under the plan of the business or of the management of all or
substantially all of the property dealt with by the plan; and (C)
commencement of distribution under the plan.i'o
The importance of this factor can be paramount. For instance, in the Second
Circuit, when a plan is substantially consummated, it is presumed that the appeal is
equitably moot.141 Unfortunately for the appellant, the plan proponent, not the
appellant, controls the timing of substantial consummation.i4 2 This authority may
allow a proponent "'stack the deck' in its favor to expedite implementation of its
plan."' 3 Among the cards a plan proponent may play include not only the possibility
of an accelerated closing, but also the waiver of the requirement of a final order as a

' See supra notes 101-109 and accompanying text
"Nordhofflnvs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 258 F.3d 180, 186-87 (3d Cir. 2001) ("it'is obligatory
upon appellant ... to pursue with diligence all available remedies to obtain a stay of execution of the
objectionable order (even to the extent of applying to the Circuit Justice for relief ...), if the failure to do
so creates a situation rendering it inequitable to reverse the orders appcaled from.'" (quoting In re
Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers Local Union # 107, 888 F.2d 293,297 (3d Cir. 1989)); see also Motor
Vehicle Cas. Co. v. Thorpe Insulation Co. (In re Thorpe Insulation Co.), 677 F.3d 869,881 (9th Cir. 2012)
("[Tihis is not a case where Appellants sat on thcir rights; they sought a stay and were refused both by us
and by the Circuit Justice.").
" See NordhoffInvs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp. (In re Zenith Elecs. Corp.), 250 B.R. 207, 215 (D.
Del. 2000).
'"Id Diligence can also be manifested in the context of the bond requirement for stay pending appeal.
Although a party may disagree with the required bond amount, a failure to contest its reasonableness may
also be viewed as a lack of diligence. In re Tribune Media Co., 799 F.3d 272, 282 (3d Cir. 2015).
Io U.S.C. § 101(2) (2012).
11
'' Momentive Performance Materials Inc. v. BOKF, NA (In re MPM Silicones, LLC), 874 F.3d 787,
804 (2d Cir. 2017); Deutsche Bank AG v. Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc. (In re Metromedia Fiber
Network, Inc.), 416 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 2005).
2 Ryan M. Murphy, Equitable Mooiness Should Be Used as a Scalpel Rather than an Axe in
Bankruptcy Appeals, 19 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 33 (2010).

14 Id
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precondition for the plan effective date.'" Although closing without a final order
prevents the closing party from knowing whether the order will be appealed,
proponents will weigh this risk against the greater chances of equitable mootness
based on the substantial consummation of the plan.' 4" Naturally, the more heavily
weighted this factor, the more willing a party will be to "close over" the appeal or
otherwise attempt to accelerate substantial consummation.'4
C. Third PartyReliance
Although all courts anchor equitable mootness to third parties' reliance, they
disagree on which parties' reliance interests should be protected.' 4 7 On the one hand,
the doctrine's protections can apply to any entities who are not named parties to the
pending appeal.' 48 proponents of this broad view suggest that it does not value one
category of entities above others while it still limits gamesmanship, a frequent
criticism of equitable mootness.'" The possibility of evading appellate review will
incentivize the parties to a potential appeal to press more aggressive provisions
knowing they may only need to pass one crucible-the bankruptcy court-rather
than two, three or even four, if the plan is appealed to the Supreme Court.'" In other
words, when plan proponents and their allies can use equitable mootness as a sword,
it alters parties' ability to use an appeal as shield to obtain negotiating leverage.'
On the other hand, some courts have only protected the reliance interests of parties
who have a sufficient impact on the success of the transaction or the debtor's
reorganization. 5 2 This view categorizes vendors, customers, and lenders as among
the appropriate beneficiaries, but the most befitting class is investors.' Absent the
inflows from investors to recapitalize the debtor, the windup of the estate and

'"See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. SGPA, Inc. (In re SGPA, Inc.), 34 F. App'x 49, 53
(3d Cir. 2002); Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. v. Jubber (In re Paige), No. 2:07-CV-822 TS, 2008 WL 2064628,
at *5 (D. Utah May 13,2008), rev'd, 584 F.3d 1327 (10th Cir. 2009).
'o Dennis J. Connolly & Sage M. Sigler, The Issue is Moot Or is it? Rethinking the Application of
EquitableMootness in Bankruptcy Appeals, 2016 ANN. SURv. BANKR.LAW (2016).
'" Id
47
' See generally David S. Kupetz, Equitable Mootness: PrudentialForbearancefrom Upsetting
Successful Reorganizations or Highly Problematic Judge-Made Abstention Doctrine, 25 NORTON J.
BANKR. L. & PRAC. (2016) (discussing how courts disagree on whose reliance interests should be

protected).
'4 See JPMCC 2007-CI Grasslawn Lodging, LLC v. Transwest Resort Props. Inc. (In re Transwest
Resort Props., Inc.), 801 F.3d 1161, 1170 (9th Cir. 2015).
" Indeed, if a sophisticated party "helps craft a reorganization plan that 'press[es] the limits' of the
bankruptcy laws, appellate consequences are a foreseeable result" Id (quoting Bank of N.Y. Tr. Co. v.
Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229,244 (5th Cir. 2009)).
" See In re One2One Conmc'ns., LLC, 805 F.3d428,447-48 (3d Cir. 2015) (Krause, J., concurring)
("[E]quitable mootness merely serves as part of a blueprint for implementing a questionable plan that
favors certain creditors over others without oversight by Article III judges.").
'" Some cases have worried that the doctrine disincentivizes bargaining. See Transwest Resort, 801
F.3d at 1170 n. 11. But, it actually just shifts the fulcrum point of leverage fbr negotiations, which may
encourage or discourage negotiations depending on the factual circumstances.
'" See In re Tribune Media Co., 799 F.3d 272,279 (3d Cir. 2015).
15

See id
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emergence of the debtor may be impossible.15 4 Thus, some courts are particularly
sensitive to the potential hardship caused by reversal to this group."'
D. Availability of Equitable andEffective Relief
Although equitable mootness is not equivalent to constitutional mootness, it still
evaluates whether effective and equitable relief can be fashioned for the benefit of
the appellant."' As part of the equitable mootness inquiry, this factor considers the
limitations on the appellant's available relief and the impact of such relief on the
transaction. 5` The easier it is for the court to compartmentalize the effect of reversal
and the more significant the relief available, the more this fictor will support the
58
appellant.s
Restructuring transactions may involve the issuance ofpublic securities,
mergers, debt for equity swaps, and other industry-specific complexities.' 5 9 Each of
these permutations may be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to undo completely
when approval of the transaction is reversed. The issuance of publicly traded
securities provides a clear illustration. Undoing the issuance of publicly traded
securities issued as consideration for claims against the debtor would require not
only cancellation of the equity consideration and the reinstatement of the debts but
also the undoing of thousands of trades involving the securities."so Even in this
situation, partial relief may still be available. The court could require sellers of the
securities to turn over the sales proceeds to the successful appellants; the appeal
would not be constitutionally moot.16' Having summarized the doctrine's origins,
pragmatic value, and its current state, this Article now turns to the laundry list of
infirmities.
IV. STATUTORY CRITIQUES

One of the most frequent criticisms of equitable mootness is its omission from
the Bankruptcy Code even though Congress enacted other appellate mootness
provisions. One well-known canon of statutory interpretation is expressio unius est
exclusio alterius ("the express mention of one thing excludes all others").1 62
Applying this canon, "where Congress includes particular language in one section of

" Id at 279-0.
ss See id at 279.

5
6 See Schaefer v. Superior Offshore Int'l, Inc. (In re Superior Offshore Int'l Inc.), 591 F.3d 350,
353-54 (5th Cir. 2009).
' See id at 353.
'n See id at 353-54 ("Remedies can be cafted for these deficiencies without completely undoing the
Plan.").
" See Jumbeck, supranote 92, at 194-99.
'6 See Alsohaibi v. Arcapita Bank B.S.C.(c) (In re Arcapita Bank B.S.C.(c)), Nos. 13 Civ.
5755(SAS), 13 Civ. 5756(SAS), 2014 WL 46552, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6,2014).
"6 See, e.g., In re Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 29 F.3d 301, 304 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, J.) ("Some of
the 14% noteholders, it is true, have already sold their stock, but they could be ordered to surrender some
or all of the proceeds to the appellants.").
6 Expressio unius est exclusio alterius,BLACK'S LAw DIcTIoNARY (10th ed. 2014).

288

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 107

-

a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposefully in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion."" In other words, "where Congress knows how to say something but
chooses not to, its silence is controlling." M The enactment of other statutory
mootness provisions in the Code suggests Congress did not intend courts to
recognize prudential or equitable-based mootness.' 6
Congress enacted appellate mootness provisions in the Code to limit the effect of
a reversal of orders granting a section 363 sale and the issuance of post-petition debt
pursuant to section 364.'" When good faith parties purchase assets free and clear
from a debtor or issue post-petition credit to a debtor, sections 363(m) and 364(e)
respectively shield them from a reversed appeal, if the relevant order is not stayed
pending appeal.16 1 Only by obtaining a stay pending appeal can an appellant reverse
the transaction without fear of statutory mootness.'6M The policy supporting these
statutory mootness provisions mirrors equitable mootness: promotion of the finality
of bankruptcy courts and protection of the reliance interests of third parties.'" Other
transactions are simply not protected by an analog to sections 363(m) and 364(e).170
Given that Congress clearly understands how to draft such provisions and the policy
7
they support, "it is not for courts to alter the balance struck by the statute.""'
Equitable mootness ignores this maxim. Courts should question the existence of
equitable mootness given Congress' decision to enact only certain specific statutory
mootness provisions rather than enact a broader provision akin to equitable
mootness.
The failure to enact equitable mootness is not an interstice in the Bankruptcy
Code. Gap filling is only appropriate when "Congress 'ambiguously addresses' an
issue in general terms" and purposely leaves gaps to be filled through judicial

"6 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987) (quoting Russello v. United States 464 U.S.
16,23 (1983)).
'"Rogers v. Freeman (In re Freeman), 527 B.R. 780, 793 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2015) (quoting Lindley
v. FDIC, 733 F.3d 1043, 1056-57 (1Ith Cir. 2013).
'1 See Ochadleus v. City of Detroit (In re City of Detroit), 838 F.3d 792, 809-10 (6th Cir. 2016)
(Moore, J., dissenting).
'" 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(m), 364(c) (2012); see also In re Ono2One Commc'ns., LLC, 805 F.3d 428,443
(3d Cir. 2015) (Krause, J., concurring).
"6 See, e.g., In re Revel AC, Inc., 802 F.3d 558, 566 (3d Cir. 2015) (discussing section 363(m));
Burchinal v. Cen. Wash. Bank (In re Adams Apple, Inc.), 829 F.2d 1484,1488 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussing
section 364(e)). The policy justification ofthese sections is that they help overcome parties' reluctance to
transact with a debtor by "permitting reliance on a bankruptcy judge's authorization." Id
'"The majority view automatically moots an unstayed appeal. Parker v. Goodman (In re Parker),
499 F.3d 616, 621 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing cases). Even the minority view espoused by the Third, Sixth and
Tenth Circuits protects counterparties by granting mootness when effective relief will impact the validity
of the transaction. See Schepis v. Burtch (In re Pursuit Capital Mgmt, LL), 874 F.3d 124, 135 (3d Cir.
2017); Brown v. Ellmann (In re Brown), 851 F.3d 619, 622 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 328
(2017); C.O.P. Coal Dev. Co. v. C.W. Mining Co. (In re C.W. Mining Co.), 641 F3d 1235, 1239 (10th
Cir. 2011).
'"See Schepis, 874 F.3d at 133-34.
'" In re Toc Assocs., L.P., Civ A. Nos. 92-6788, 92-6772, 92-6773, 92-6775, Bankruptcy No.
91-23375T, 1993 WL 276993, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 1993).
17' Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. 415, 427 (2014).
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discretion.'" Otherwise, judges are usurping Congress' authority and upsetting the
balance of the separation of powers.'7 1 Simply put, when no intentional gaps exist,
"[a court] may not stretch a statute to create such gaps." 74 There is no evidence that
Congress enacted sections 363(m) and 364(e), while also leaving a gap for equitable
mootness to fill.17s

Indeed, the overlap between the statutory mootness provisions and equitable
mootness makes the existence of an interstice even more unlikely. Although
equitable mootness will not shield every transaction protected by sections 363(m) or
364(e), many transactions will be covered by both.' 76 This overlap violates another
canon of statutory construction: the avoidance of interpretations that render statutory
language superfluous.'" Why would Congress ever have enacted section 363(m) or
364(e) when they are swallowed whole by equitable mootness?
V. IT'S NOT REALLY MOOTNESS, IT'S JUST PRUDENCE AND EQUITY

Judge Posner suggested that equitable mootness "is perhaps best described as
merely an application of the age-old principle that in formulating equitable relief a
court must consider the effects of the relief on innocent third parties."'" Although
undoubtedly true, equity is by its nature fact-intensive and the full development of
parties' positions is a prerequisite for equitable determinations.' Trial courts are
properly tasked with fact-intensive equitable determinations; "determining equities
in the first instance is seldom fit grist for the appellate mill."' Even though it is
sitting in appellate jurisdiction, the district court is without the benefit of the

.

172 Indian Motocycle Assocs. III Ltd. Pship v. Mass. Hous. Fin. Agency, 66 F.3d 1246, 1251 n.8 (I st
Cir. 1995) (quoting Conille v. Sec'y of HUD, 840 F.2d 105, 110 n.6 (Ist Cir. 1988)); see also Ochadleus
v. City of Detroit (In re City of Detroit), 838 F.3d 792, 810 (6th Cir. 2016) (Moore, J., dissenting).
'" Cf Ga. Power Co. v. Sanders, 617 F.2d 1 12, 1127-28 (5th Cir. 1980) (Fay, J., concurring) (stating
that there are no separation of powers concern where federal common law rules properly existed).
" In re One2One Commc'ns, LLC, 805 F.3d 428, 444 (3d Cir. 2015) (Krause, J., concurring).
7
' 5 See Ochadleus, 838 F.3d at 810 (Moore, J., dissenting).
'"See, e.g., Campbell v. Motors Liquidation Co. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 428 B.R. 43, 60
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (providing that appeal was moot under both section 363(m) and equitable mootness).
Moreover, instances of this overlap are likely underreported because when statutory mootness applies,
courts will often fail to analyze an alternative argument of equitable mootness even though it may apply.
See, e.g., Contrarian Funds LLC v. Aretex LLC (In re Westpoint Stevens, Inc.), 600 F.3d 231, 253-54
(2d Cir. 2010).
'" In re Sundale, Ltd., 471 B.R. 300, 303 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2012) (citing Nunnally v. Equifax Info.
Servs., LLC, 451 F.3d 768, 773 (11th Cir. 2006)); In re Fairfield Sentry Ld., 452 B.R. 52, 59 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing United States v. Novak, 476 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir. 2007)).
'"In re Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 29 F.3d 301, 304 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, C.J.); see alsoInre Tribune
Media Co., 799 F.3d 272, 287 (3d Cir. 2015) (Ambro, J., concurring) ("Our take is that, in the equitable
mootness context, courts may consider whether it is fair in stark circumstances to grant relief that will
scramble a consummated plan or will upset third parties' legitimate reliance on the finality of such a
plan."); In re AOV Indus., Inc., 792 F.2d 1140, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("Even when the moving party is
not entitled to dismissal on article III grounds, common sense or equitable considerations may justify a
decision not to decide a case on the merits.").
" Quenzer v. United States (In re Quenzer), 19 F.3d 163, 165 (5th Cir. 1993).

11" Id
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bankruptcy court's decision, let alone its fact-finding. It must make the equitable
mootness determination in the first instance.Ist Given the district court's
unfamiliarity with the case and a limited record on appeal, it is perhaps
understandable if the district court is prone to believing the appellee's "parade of
horribles" that will result from the possibility of reversal and remand."8 2 To make
matters worse, it is well-established that many district court judges lack interest in
bankruptcy.' To summarize, equitable mootness requires an equitable
determination by an appellate court, on a limited record, without the benefit of a trial
court decision, who would rather not have the case.
Equitable mootness' continued popularity is surprising given that it is swinmming
against the current of anti-prudential Supreme Court opinions. A strong tension
exists between doctrines based upon judicial discretion and the duty of federal courts
to fully exercise their jurisdiction under statute and the Constitution. 18 Indeed, if
subject matter jurisdiction exists, "a federal court's 'obligation' to hear and decide a
case is 'virtually unflagging.""" This conclusion is natural, given bankruptcy
jurisdiction, like all other species of federal jurisdiction, is limited to the bases
prescribed by statute or the Constitution and otherwise does not exist.'"
The Supreme Court has recently refused to confirm the continued vitality of
ripeness' 8 7 or standing'" when they are based on prudence rather than a statute. Tie
Court's discomfort likely stems from its unwillingness to undermine the balance of
powers and defy the elected branches. "Just as a court cannot apply its independent
policy judgment to recognize a cause of action that Congress has denied, . .. it cannot
limit a cause of action that Congress has created merely because 'prudence'
dictates.""' Recognizing the problems inherent in prudential limitations, the
Supreme Court has sought to reallocate standing limitations like the zone of interests
and the prohibition against generalized grievances into statutory or constitutional

"" 'This issue has also created uncertainty regarding the appropriate level of appellate review for a
Circuit Court to apply. See generallyMatthew D. Pechous, Walking the Tight Rope andNot the Plank: A
Proposed Standard for Second-Level Appellate Review of Equitable Mootness Determinations, 28
EMORY BANKR. DEv. J. 547 (2012) (canvasing circuit courts' appellate review standards and asserting
abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard).
'" But see Selene Fin. LP v. Brown (In re Brown), 563 B.R. 451, 455 (D. Mass. 2017) ("Although
Brown argues that remand would portend a 'nightmarish' scenario in the Bankruptcy Court, there is little
or nothing to support a parade of horribles.").
'"McKenzie, supra note 21, at 791-92.
'" See Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77 (2013).
Id ("Jurisdiction existing, this Court has cautioned, a federal court's 'obligation' to hear and
decide a case is 'virtually unflagging.'") (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist v. United States,
424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)).
" See Wasserman v. Immormino (In re Granger Garage, Inc.), 921 F.2d 74, 77 (6th Cir. 1990) ("llc
subject matter jurisdiction ofthe bankruptcy court is limited to that which Congress specifically grants.").
1
1 Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2347 (2014).
'8 Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 125-26 (2014); see also
Excel Willowbrook, LL.C. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, Nat. Ass'n, 758 F.3d 592, 603 n.34 (5th Cir. 2014)
(interpreting Lexmark).
'9 Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 128 (citation omitted).
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boxes rather than leave them as prudential limitations." In the case of equitable
mootness, neither of these options apply. Congress failed to incorporate it into the
Bankruptcy Code.' Equitable mootness' very existence is predicated on its broader
scope compared to constitutional mootness.' Nonetheless, equitable mootness has
bucked this recent trend through a combination of inertia and its strong policy
underpinnings."*
Attempts to characterize equitable mootness as a branch of mootness, abstention,
waiver, or forfeiture fare no better. 'There is a big difference between inability to
alter the outcome (real mootness) and unwillingness to alter the outcome ('equitable
mootness')."'" Other courts have characterized it as a species of delayed
adjudication like abstention and the common lawforum non conveniens." Equitable
mootness, however, does not delay adjudication for another day in another court, it
ends the matter by abdicating jurisdiction." Still others have categorized the
doctrine as a species of waiver or forfeiture.'" These rationales are also flawed.
Waiver and forfeiture are based upon the litigant's actions; waiver arises from a
litigant's intentional relinquishment of a known right," while forfeiture arises from
a litigant's failure to timely assert a right." The only equitable mootness factor
under the appellant's control is whether they seek a stay pending appeal. 2 ' Given
the existence of the other factors, waiver and forfeiture provide insufficient support
for the doctrine.
The strategic value of equitable mootness promotes gamesmanship and
encourages any party to invoke it no matter the chance of success. The failure to
consider the merits may be normatively attractive at first glance; if the harm caused
by a reversal is sufficient, the merits are immaterial. 201 This rationale must be

" Smith, Jr., supra note 3, at 875-76 (analyzing Lexmark). Professor Smith persuasively asserts that
that the reallocation of prudential doctrines into new boxes-either statutory or constitutional-is both
immaterial (the doctrines are still get applied) and dangerous (the doctrines have firmer support). See id
at 915 ("[There are significant reasons to doubt that recategorizing prudential rules will do much to
facilitate representative democracy.").
" See genemlly supra Part IV.
* See In re UNR Indus., Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 1994).

a9 See Ochadleus v. City of Detroit (In re City of Detroit), 838 F.3d 792, 800 (6th Cir. 2016).

' In re UNR

Indus., 20 F.3d at 769.
'" See, e.g., Samson Energy Res. Co. v. Semcrude, LP. (In re Semcrude, LP.), 728 F.3d 314, 317
(3d Cir. 2013).
' In re One20nc Commc'ns, LLC, 805 F.3d 428, 440-41 (3d Cir. 2015) (Krause, J., concurring).
The abstention provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) allows a district court to abstain from hearing a
bankruptcy proceeding pursuant to comity or the interest ofjustice. Id at 442. This provision, however,
only applies to district court's original jurisdiction under Title 11, rather than their appellate jurisdiction
(which is implicated by equitable mootness). Id
'"See, e.g., Ochadleus, 838 F.3d at 798.

'9 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938); Journe v. Journe, 911 F. Supp. 43,47 (D.P.R. 1995).
'"Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944). For a discussion ofwaiver and forfeiture and
its intersection with the constitutional and statutory jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts, consider, Robert
Miller, Nothing New: Consent, Forfeiture, and BankruptcyCourt FinalJudgments, 65 DRAKE L. REv. 89

(2017).
'o See In re One2One, 805 F.3d at 444 (Krause, J., concurring).
" See id at 434 (majority opinion).
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weighed against the unfairness to appellants whose appeals will never be determined
on the merits" and use of equitable mootness as a sword by proponents of the
complex transaction.2 os While appellants may have colorable or even winning
arguments that will never be considered,2 04 the proponents of the transaction will
rationally rush to implement it and equitably moot any appeal.205 This is particularly
true when the proponents advocate legally questionable provisions. 206 Indeed, such
tactics are now so commonplace that "a motion to dismiss an appeal as equitably
moot has become 'part of the Plan."' 2 ' Appellees are only rationally reacting to the
incentives provided by equitable mootness. Besides the cost of briefing the motion
to dismiss, no other barrier exists to preclude an appellee from invoking the doctrine.
Even when the chances of successfully dismissing the appeal are small, the benefit
is so large compared to the cost that an appellee will rationally move for dismissaL
The problems inherent in the prudential nature of equitable mootness are perhaps
best illustrated by its application to transactions involving complex settlements.
Complex plans and transactions usually include a global settlement among all the
main constituencies, which together with releases, injunctions, and exculpation
208
provisions, facilitate finality among the parties and limit related third party claims.
Because they are often contentious, the global settlement or the associated protective
provisions are frequently appealed if they are approved. 20 What naturally follows is
the familiar refrain in motions to dismiss based upon equitable mootness-a reversal
will throw the case into chaos and potentially make the debtor's current path to
emergence unviable. 21 o This may be true, and the cost of a reversal may be high in
terms of administrative expense and even endanger the viability of a
reorganization. 211 Regardless, confirmation should never be granted if the appellant
is correct on the merits and the settlement does not satisfy the applicable legal

n See id

See id at 446 (Krause, J., concurring); NordhoffInvs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 258 F.3d 180,
185 (3d Cir. 2001); id at 191 (Alito, J., concurring) ("It is disturbing that Zenith, in a sceming attempt to
moot any appeal prior to filing, succeeded in implementing most of the plan before the appellants even
received notice that the plan had been confirmed.").
See, e.g., In re Cont'l Airlines, 91 F-3d 553, 567-68 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting).
n See, e.g., Bennett v. Jefferson Cty., 518 B.R. 613, 639 (N.D. Ala. 2014) ("This court is not inclined
to dismiss Ratepayers' appeal as 'equitably moot' based on the rush to consummation.") (citing Search
Market Direct, Inc. v. Jubber (In re Paige), 584 F.3d 1327, 1343 (10th Cir. 2009)).
2 In re One2One, 805 F.3d at 453 (Krause, J., concurring).
' Id at 446. The problem of gamesmanship cannot be blamed on the litigants. Zealous representation
requires appellees' counsel to cmploy equitable mootness as efficiently as possible. A counsel should bake
provisions into a plan that will increase the likelihood of a dismissal based on equitable mootness.
See Jumbeck, supra note 92, at 214-16 (discussing In re Tribune Media Co., 799 F.3d 272 (3d
Cir. 2015), and R' Invs., LDC v. Charter Commc'ns, Inc. (In re Charter Commc'n, Inc.), 691 F.3d 476
(2d Cir. 2012)).
' See, e.g., CharterConuc'ns, 691 F.3d at 479; Coll. Props., II, Ltd. v. Mullen (In re Coll. Props.,
Ltd.), Nos. AZ-07-1075-PaAK, 05-10095,05-15155 2007 WL 7540957, at *1, *4 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Aug.
14,2007).
21
o See, e.g., In re Tribune Media, 799 F.3d at 280-81; CharterCommc'ns, 691 F.3d at 485.
211
See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 729,730 n.6 ("The direct
costs of bankruptcy, primarily professional fees, are enormous.").
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standards. 2 12 Going back to the drawing board is the appropriate result even if the
consequences for the debtor are dire. 21 3
The costs of equitable mootness to the bankruptcy system itself are high. The
lack of appeals in bankruptcy cases is well documented. 2 14 Whether due to dwindling
resources, preference for negotiation over litigation, or the need for finality, few
bankruptcy matters are appealed. 215 The importance of the few first-level appeals
that do occur is further diminished because in some jurisdictions, first-level appeals
may not even bind trial courts.216 Equitable mootness further pares the amount of
appellate precedent by dismissing potentially precedent-making appeals without
determinations on the merits. 217
Nonetheless, judges often find that the ficilitation of reorganization trumps the
appellants' rights on the merits."' On the one hand, weighing the prejudice wrought
by reversal of a complex settlement as part of the equitable mootness inquiry will
lead to more reorganizations. Certainly, settlements and reorganizations are favored
generally in the bankruptcy context.219 On the other hand, ifparties believe they have
limited rights to appeal, they may decide to exit the distressed debt space entirely
rather than risk being left without appellate rights. 0 Moreover, the possibility of
equitable mootness alters parties' leverage on appeal by limiting the ability to
threaten to appeaL Congress has not prescribed how to balance these interests even
though it clearly knows how to protect parties from appellate reversal. It has done
exactly that in two separate places in the Bankruptcy Code, sections 363(m) and
364(e). Allowing a judge to balance these concerns as part of a potential dismissal
of an appeal without even considering the merits effectively lets the judge substitute

212 See Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S.
414,435 (1968) ("[A] plan of rcorganization which is unfair to some persons may not be approved by the
court21even
though the vast majority of creditors have approved it").
3
See In re Cont'1 Airlincs, 91 F.3d 553, 567-68 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasizing
the tension between the district court's decision to dismiss the appeal as equitably moot while also noting
that the
appellants were likely to win on the merits of their appeal).
214
See McKenzie, supra note 21, at 783 (explaining that "almost no bankmuptcy litigation goes farther
than215
the bankruptcy court").
See id at 783-84, 787-89.
2 There is no consensus on this issue. No definitive case law exists and in a survey, just over halfof
bankruptcy judges felt bound by district court precedent from their district. See George W. Kuney, Where
We Are and Where We Think We Are: An Empirical Examination of Bankruptcy Precedent, 28 CAL.
BANKR. J. 71, 84 (2005) (discussing whether or not bankruptcyjudges in a poll felt bound by the decisions
of their circuit's district courts).
"'See Bank ofN.Y. Tr. Co. v. Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.), 584
F.3d 229, 244 (5th Cir. 2009) (asserting that complex cramdown issues "cry out" for appellate review);
Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Alternative Structuresfor Bankruptcy Appeals, 76 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 625, 627-28 (2002) (noting the lack of circuit-level bankruptcy precedent).
2
m See In re Cont'l Airlines, 91 F.3d at 571 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that equitable mootness
reflects a tension between the imperative of an appellate court to adjudicate the merits of an appeal and
adherence to a policy that promotes "facilitation of reorganizations and the protection of those who
reasonably
rely on reorganization plans").
219
See Protective Comm. fbr Indep. Stockholders of TIIT Trailer Ferry Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S.
414,424 (1968).
' See In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d at 244 & n.19.
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him or herself for Congress. This is exactly the concern supporting the Supreme
Court's retreat from other prudential justiciability doctrines. 2 2 Returning to the
relationship between the limited nature of bankruptcy jurisdiction and the duty to
fully exercise it, courts cannot use prudence as a basis to extend bankruptcy
jurisdiction to facilitate a particular plan because it is in the public's interest.' How
can they accomplish the same result by cutting off an appeal without hearing the
merits? They can't.
A. ConstitutionalConcerns
Although little unites the Supreme Court's jurisprudence concerning the
separation of powers, one tie is the necessity of Article III supervision and review of
bankruptcy judges' final determinations of private rights.223 Equitable mootness
broadly eliminates Article IH supervision because parties lose the right to appeal to
an Article III judge, regardless of the taxonomy (public, private or otherwise) of the
rights at issue. 224 Only recently have cases analyzed the constitutionality ofthis issue
and their treatment has been brief 225 This article delves deeper and concludes that
equitable mootness is unconstitutional because it disregards the appellate rights
historically provided in bankruptcy matters at common law and under the 1800
Bankruptcy Act.2 6
Although bankruptcy judges are authorized by statute to enter final judgments on
certain claims, their status as non-Article III judges further circumscribes this
authority. 227 Ever since Congress attempted to expand the authority of bankruptcy

"'See Lexmark Int'i, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128(2014) ("We do not
ask whether in our judgment Congress should have authorized Static Control's suit, but whether Congress
in fact did so.").
m In re Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 228-29 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Binder v. Price
Waterhouse & Co., LLP (In re Resorts Int'l., Inc.1 372 F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 2004).
' See Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1944-45 (2015) (discussing the
importance of Article III supervision); Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 482-83 (2011) (discussing
constitutional principles of Article Ill adjudication and separation of powers); N. Pipeline Const. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,91 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
m See Ochadleus v. City of Detroit (In re City of Detroit 838 F.3d 792, 811-12 (6th Cir. 2016)
(Moore, J., dissenting); In re Onc2One Commc'ns, LLC, 805 F.3d 428, 443-46 (3d Cir. 2015) (Krause,
J., concurring); Nordhofflnvs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 258 F.3d 180, 185, 192 (3d Cir. 2001) (Alito,
J., concurring).
m See Ochadleus, 838 F.3d at 811-12 (Moore, J., dissenting); In re Tribune Media Co., 799 F.3d
272, 285-86 (3d Cir. 2015) (discussing, but rejecting the concern that equitable mootncss "insulates the
judgments of Article I bankruptcy judges' from review by an Article III tribunal" and thus violates
personal constitutional rights); In re One2One, 805 F.3d at 443-46 (Krause, J., concurring) (asserting that
Congressional intent for the creation of bankruptcy courts was to "authorize [those courts] to abstain from
hearing state law claims in certain circumstances-not to allow district courts to abdicate their appellate
jurisdiction").
m Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, repealedby Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248 ("An
act to establish an unifom System of Bankruptcy throughout the United States").
m See Sher v. JP Morgan Chase Funding, Inc. (In re TMST, Inc.), Nos. 09-17787 (NVA),
ll-00340(NVA), 2015 WL 4080077, at *4 (D. Md. July 6,2015) (discussing that claims must be both
statutorily and constitutionally core for a bankruptcy court to possess final adjudicatory authority).
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judges to enter final judgments by enacting the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the
"Reform Act")," it has been unable to balance its statutory grant of final
adjudicatory authority to Article I bankruptcy courts with the demands of Article III
of the Constitution. Twice has the Supreme Court rejected statutes granting
bankruptcy judges authority to enter final judgments when adjudicating traditional
private rights.' The constitutional issue posed by equitable mootness is a different
side of the same coin. It concerns the elimination of Article III appellate review of
an Article I tribunal's final judgment rather than the authority of Article I judges to
enter an initial final judgment.
Even when the Supreme Court outlined a test for determining whether actions
can be finally determined by bankruptcy judges,2 0 it has failed to confirm the source
of this authority.2 3' As a result, lower courts and academics have fashioned theories
to flesh out the Supreme Court's test. The three most popular theories are the
appellate review theory, the public rights theory, and the historical theory. This
Article draws from the pools of ink spilled reviewing these three theories and recent
Supreme Court jurisprudence to evaluate each theory and apply them to equitable
mootness.
For years, courts and commentators have grappled with litigants' right.-Io
appellate review from a final determination by a non-Article III court. 2 Many have
suggested "sufficiently searching [appellate] review" is required to allow initial

' Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at II U.S.C. (2012), in scattered sections
of 28 U.S.C. (2012), and in scattered sections of other titles of U.S.C. (2012)).
' See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 469 (2011) (discussing the fact that while bankruptcy court
has statutory authority to enter final judgment, it does not have constitutional authority); N. Pipeline
Const Co. v. Marathon Pipc Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982) (holding that the "broad grant ofjurisdiction
to the bankruptcy courts contained in 28 U.S.C. §1471 is unconstitutional"). The Supreme Court has
subsequently narrowed the effect of these opinions by allowing litigant consent and forfeiture to grant a
bankruptcy judge adjudicatory authority it would otherwise find unconstitutional under Article Ill. See
Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1949 (2015) (holding that "Article III permits
bankruptcy courts to decide Stern claims submitted to them by consent").
a Although the Supreme Court stated that "the question is whether the action at issue stems from the
bankruptcy itself or would necessarily be resolved in the claims allowance process," it failed to cite to any
source of authority in establishing this test Stern, 564 U.S. at 499.
2
m See Ralph Brubaker, Non-Article III Adjudication: Bankritcy and Nonbankruptcy, With and
Without Litigant Consent, 33 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 11, 39 (2016) (explaining that a majority of the
Court has "never agreed on a constitutional theory that would validate final-judgment adjudications by
non-Article I bankruptcy judges without consent of thc litigants" (emphasis removed)).
' See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, andArticle III,
101 HARV. L. REv. 915, 918, 924-26 (1988) (discussing the theory that "adequately searching appollate
review of the judgments of legislative courts and administrative agencies is both necessary and sufficient
to satisfy the requirements of Article Ill"); Thomas W. Merrill, Article HI, Agency Adjudication, and the
Originsofthe Appellate Review Model ofAdministrative Law, 111 COLUM. L REv. 939, 992-95 (2011)
(distinguishing various contrasting court opinions on this issue); Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the
PoliticalBranches, 107 COUM. L. REV. 559, 605-13 (2007) (providing a general overview of modern
commentary on this issue); Gordon G. Young, Public Rights and the FederalJudicialPower: From
Murray's Lessee Through Crowell to Schor, 35 BuFF. L. REv. 765, 767 (1986) (discussing the Supreme
Court's "increasingly broad exceptions to the Constitution's requirement that federal judicial cases be
tried by an equal and independent federal judicial branch of govemment").
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non-Article III adjudication. 233 Originating from statements in the Supreme Court's
opinion in Crowell v. Benson,34 adherents to this "appellate review theory" rely upon
Article III appellate review as both a necessary and sufficient basis to allow an
Article I court to make a final adjudication. Although there is no agreed-upon
definition for the level of appellate review required, Article III de novo review of
questions of law is the minimum suggested standard." Of course, equitable
mootness precludes any appellate review on the merits, let alone de novo review."
Although equitable mootness fails the appellate review model, the impact of this
conclusion is merely academic because, as will subsequently be explained, the
appellate review theory does not explain the constitutional authority of bankruptcy
judges.
The Supreme Court has suggested but not confirmed two other possibilities for
why bankruptcy judges can issue final judgments without being Article III judges:
(i) they have the same authority as bankruptcy commissioners at common law who
could issue certain final judgments or (ii) certain bankruptcy matters are public rights
that do not require Article III supervision at all." On the one hand, if the historical
view of bankruptcy judges' authority bounds the right to appeal from their
judgments, then the same appellate rights that attached to a commissioner's final
judgment currently attach to a modern bankruptcy judge's final judgment. On the
other hand, if the public rights theory governs, appellate review is not necessary at
all because no Article III intervention is required.
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence strongly supports the historical perspective.
The Court has failed to confirm the public rights doctrine as the font for bankruptcy
judges' ability to enter final judgments despite multiple opportunities. 238 In stark
contrast, the Supreme Court has often embraced bankruptcy judges' historical roots
as the foundation for its separation of powers teachings." Based on these teachings,
bankruptcy judges' authority to enter final judgments maps onto the jurisdiction of

a See, e.g., McKenzie, supra note 21, at 771; Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture:
Legislative and Administrative Courts Under Article 111, 65 IND. L. 233, 267-68 (1990) (arguing for
Article IHI review to "control the legality and constitutionality of the powers asserted and exercised [by
the Article I court in the first instance]').
23 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
23s See Fallon, Jr., supra 232, at 983 n.367 (discussing a reviewing court's deference to the lower
courts decision, while focusing on a "reasonable basis in law" standard).
' See Samson Energy Res. Co. v. Semcrude LP. (In re Semcrude, L.P.), 728 F.3d 314, 32425 (3d
Cir. 2013) (discussing the consequences of a successful appeal that are often "more appropriately dealt
with by fashioning limited relief at the remedial stage than by refusing to hear the merits ... at its outset").
m See infra Section VI.C and VI.D.
See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 492 n.7 (2011); Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S.
33, 56 n.Il (1989)..
m See Stern, 564 U.S. at 484; Graqfinanciera,492 U.S. at 56-57; N. Pipeline Constr. Co v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 90 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Schoenthal v. Irving Tr. Co., 287 U.S.
92, 94-95 (1932). For scholarly articles discussing the Supreme Court's reliance on history in the context
of bankruptcy, see Ralph Brubaker, One Hundred Years of FederalBankruptcy Law and Still Clinging to
an In rem Model of Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, 15 BANKR. DEv. J. 261 (1999), and Robert W. Miller,
Everything Old is New Again: Why the In rem Summary Jurisdictionof the 1898 Bankruptcy Act Still
Limits the ConstitutionalAuthority of Bankruptcy Judges, 89 AiM. BANKR. LJ. 1, 8-17 (2015).
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bankruptcy commissioners at common law and under the 1800 Bankruptcy Act.240
The appellate jurisdiction of courts of the Chancellor at common law and the district
court under the 1800 Bankruptcy Act is similarly concomitant to the appellate
jurisdiction of district courts. 241 Just as litigants in bankruptcy court today have the
same right to a final adjudication by an Article IlIjudge as common law litigants had
from the court of equity or law, they have the same right to appellate review.
Equitable mootness limits this right to an appeal in a way that was not recognized at
common law or under the 1800 Bankruptcy Act. Just like the bankruptcy court final
adjudication of the claims in Stern and Marathon, equitable mootness is similarly
unconstitutional.
This section will briefly recap the issues presented by bankruptcy judges' lack of
Article III status. It will then summarize the preeminent theories regarding Article I
adjudications and Article III appellate review: appellate review theory, public rights,
and historic rights. It will explain why historic rights establish the right of appeal
from a bankruptcy judge's final judgement and then finally describe how equitable
mootness violates these historic rights.
L Bankruptcy Judges and Article Ill
Congress may establish courts under both Article M and Article I of the
Constitution, 242 however, the constitutional authority and required attributes of
Article HI and Article I courts differ. The distinctions between Article III courts and
Article I courts reflect the separation of powers among the three branches of
government. The greater protection provided by their independence and their
commensurately greater constitutional authority distinguish Article IH courts from
their Article I counterparts. 243
Issuing a final judgment in a federal case at law, equity, or admiralty applies
Article IH judicial power-authority reserved for an Article LI judge by Article HI,
section 2 of the Constitution. 2 4 Congress cannot grant authority to enter such final
judgments to a non-Article III court. 245 In other words, "Congress may not 'withdraw
from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at
the common law, or in equity, or admiralty."' 2 " This is the heart of judicial power
and must be exercised by an Article III judge.247

m See Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct 1932, 1951 (2015) (Roberts, J., dissenting);
id at 1965 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Brubaker, supra note 231, at 48.
' See WellnessInt'l, 135 S. Ct. at 1940, 1946, 1957-58 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
' See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 406-407 (1973).
243
See Stern, 564 U.S. at 482-84 ("Article III is an inseparable element of the constitutional system
of checks and balances that both defines the power and protects the independence ofthe Judicial Branch.")
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
* Id at 482-83, 488 (defining the power and how it protects the independence of the Judicial
Branch).
2s Id at 484.
mId (quoting Murmy's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 284 (1856)).
w See In re Todd Shipyards Corp., 92 B.R. 600, 604 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1988) (citing N. Pipeline Const.
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69-70 (1982)).
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Playing its part in the separation of powers among the three governmental
branches, Article III of the Constitution insulates judges appointed to the Supreme
Court and the inferior courts created by Congress from political pressures by the
other branches. 2 48 Article HI, section 1, "establishes a broad policy that federal
judicial power shall be vested in courts whose judges enjoy life tenure and fixed
compensation."24 9 These protections have come to mean that Article 11 judges may
only be removed through impeachment by the senate and that their compensation is
irreducible. 2" In contrast, Article I judges' benefits and protections are not enshrined
in the Constitution; they are a matter of legislative grace." Absent the requirement
that judicial power be exercised by Article III judges, the separation of powers would
be illusory. Congress could simply vest all judicial power in the Article I courts and
pressure them through manipulation of their pay or retention.2 s2
The Supreme Court has famously rejected Congressional attempts to allow
bankruptcy judges to adjudicate private rights in Stern v. Marshall and Northern
Pipeline Construction Co. v. MarathonPipe Line Co. The genesis of these cases is
the distinction between Article Ill district court judges and their Article I bankruptcy
judge counterparts. Although a bankruptcy court is a unit of the district court,253 a
bankruptcy judge is an Article I judge, not an Article Il judge.2 5 Because Congress
established bankruptcy courts pursuant to its Article I powers, they can be (and are)
staffed with bankruptcy judges who do not receive the same benefits of life tenure
and salary protection afforded to Article III judges. 255 As Justice Rehnquist asserted
in Marathon and Justice Roberts confirmed in Stern, Article I bankruptcy judges
cannot exercise the judicial power of the United States by making final
determinations ofprivate rights, which are actions that are "the stuff ofthe traditional
actions at common law tried by the courts of Westminster in 1789."56 If it Were only
that simple. The Supreme Court's jurisprudence concerning the role of non-Article
III courts in general, and bankruptcy courts in particular, parallels the mythical

- N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 59; see also Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix,
Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 541 (9th Cir. 1984) (cn banc) ("A separate and independent judiciary, and the
guarantees that assure it, are present constitutional necessities, not relics ofantique ideas.").
2 Tllhomas v. Union Carbide Agr. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 582 (1985); see also U.S. CONsr. art.
III, § I ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office.").
2 N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 59.
25
' See Stern, 564 U.S. at 484, 494; Leandra Lederman, Equity and the Article I Court: Is the Tax
(2001).
Court's
252 Exercise of Equitable Powers Constitutional, 5 FLA. TAX REv. 357, 360
See Stern, 564 U.S. at 484.
25 28 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
2 See N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 60-61.
2
Bankruptcy judges under the Reform Act and BAFJA serve 14-year terms, can be removed for
misconduct, neglect of duty or physical/mental disability by the judicial council of the circuit in which
the judge's official duty station is located and their salaries could be reduced by Congress. Id at 61; Stern,
564 U.S. at 514-15 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
' Stern, 564 U.S. at 484 (quoting N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 90 (Rehnquist, J., concurring)).
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hydra; in answering one question, three others immediately appear.2 5 7 The analysis
ofthe constitutionality of equitable mootness exacerbates this uncertainty by moving
beyond the muddled waters of bankruptcy courts' initial ability to enter final
judgments into the truly uncharted depths of the appellate rights stemming from a
bankruptcy court final judgment.
ii. Appellate Review Theory
Until recently, the constitutional issues arising from bankruptcy judges' Article I
status were cabined to the entry of final judgments, rather than appellate review.
Circuit judges (albeit in dissents and concurrences) have questioned the
constitutionality of equitable mootness due to its elimination of appellate review of
the bankruptcy judge's final order. In support of their criticisms, these judges have
relied upon the appellate review theory. 258
"The core claim of [appellate review theory] is that sufficiently searching review
of a legislative court's or administrative agency's decisions by a constitutional court
will always satisfy the requirements of article U."259 The genesis of this theory is
Crowell v. Benson.' In Crowell, a government agency adjudicated a workers'
compensation claim even though the claim would have been a private right subject
to federal admiralty jurisdiction.26 ' The Court held that Congress could
constitutionally vest the agency with the authority to adjudicate factual questions
inherent in the compensation claim, given that Article III courts retained "complete
authority to insure the proper application of the law" -i.e. appellate review.2 2 In
other words, "the presence of appellate review by an Art. III court will go a long way
toward ensuring a proper separation of powers."
The Crowell majority
characterized the scope of "the judicial power of the United States," as a question of
ultimate judicial control rather than initial adjudication. 2 " In essence, "[t]he

See, e.g., Tyson A. Crist, Stern v. Marshall: Application of the Supreme Court's Landmark
Decision in the Lower Courts, 86 Am. Bankr. LJ. 627, 671-79 (2012); Miller, supra note 239, at 1 (2015)
(profiling some ofthe many issues created by Stern).
' See, e.g., Ochadleus v. City of Detroit (In re City ofDetroit), 838 F.3d 792, 811-12(6th Cir. 2016)
(Moore, J., dissenting); In re One2One Commc'ns, LLC, 805 F.3d 428,444 & n. 10 (3d Cir. 2015) (Krause,
J., concurring).
a Fallon, Jr., supra note 232, at 933.
*285 U.S. 22 (1932).
' Id at 39.
mId at 54. The appellate review theory arose from concern that petty administrative finctions would
swamp Article 11 courts' dockets. Merrill, supra note 232, at 990 (describing the federal judiciary's
reluctance to be dragged into administrative adjudications).
' N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 115 (1982) (White, J., dissenting)
(stating that this is suggested in Crowell).
' McKenzie, supra 21, at 772; Bator, supra note 233, at 267. As Professor McKenzie explained,
from a pragmatic perspective, Article III courts do not have a "realistic ability to review and control the
fimctions" ofbankruptcy courts. McKenzie, supra note 21, at 772. The reasons for the lack oftrue control
are numerous including the lack of appeals in bankruptcy cases, the limited precedential value of first
level bankruptcy appeals, and even equitable mootness. Id at 277-92. Although Professor McKenzie
recognizes pragmatic shortcomings, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding bankruptcy cases
remains rooted in formalism and history.
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available appellate review by article III courts offer[s] sufficient protection for article
[H values." 265 In their opinions in City of Detroit and One2One Communications,

Inc., Judges Moore and Krause respectively, cited the appellate review theory in
support of their respective criticisms of equitable mootness. 2" Neither deeply
analyzed the theory. This limited treatment may have been intentional. The Supreme
Court's bankruptcy precedents embarrass the appellate review model 267
Appellate review has been central to the constitutionality of bankruptcy court
adjudications, 26 just not in the way the appellate review theory posits. Starting in
Northern Pipeline, the Supreme Court stressed the importance of de novo of
adjudications of private rights by bankruptcy courts.2 9 It contrasted the de novo
review of magistrate judges upheld by United States v. Raddat,2 70 With the
deferential appellate review of bankruptcy judges' fmal judgments under the Reform
Act. 2 71 The Court reiterated this point in Stern when criticizing the deferential
appellate review of bankruptcy judges' final judgments of Stern claims under
BAFJA. 2 " Even more recently, in Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison,

the Court echoed Raddatz when it held that the presence of de novo review (not to
be confused with appellate review) by a district court eliminated constitutional
concerns posed by the bankruptcy judge's initial adjudication of a Stern claim. 3
Northern Pipeline and Stern say little about non-private rights, the type of rights
usually affected by equitable mootness. With the notable exception of third party
releases,274 the adjudications subject to equitable mootness are usually not private

Fallon, supranote 232, at 991.
Ochadleus v. City of Detroit (In re City of Detroit), 838 F.3d 792, 811-12 (6th Cir. 2016) (Moore,
J., dissenting); In re One2One Commc'ns, LLC, 805 F.3d 428, 444 & n.10 (3d Cir. 2015) (Krause, J.,
concurring).
' Compare supra notes 258-260 and accompanying text with Fallon, supra note 259, at 991
(asserting that Northern Pipelie was incorrectly decided because the Article I11 review was sufficient to
allow bankruptcy court adjudication of private rights).
n See Ochadleus, 838 F.3d at 811 (Moore, J., dissenting).
* N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 78-79,82 n.33 (1982).
447 U.S. 664,683-84 (1980).
7 N. Pipeline,458 U.S. at 82-83.
2 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462,487 (2011); see also In re One2One Commc'ns, LLC, 805 F.3d
428, 433 (3d Cir. 2015) ("[Tjhe Court in Stern made clear that non-Article HI bankruptcy judges do not
have the constitutional authority to adjudicate a claim that is exclusively based upon a legal right grounded
in state law despite appellate review of the bankruptcy judge's decision by an Article III judge.").
m Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165,2170 (2014). In the same vein, the majority
in Weliness confirmed litigants' ability to consent to the final determination of Stern claims by a
bankruptcy judge, in part, because "Article HI courts retain supervisory authority over the process."
Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1944-45 (2015).
4 See Opt-Out Lenders v. Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC (In re Millennium Lab Holdings 11,
LLC) 242 F.3d 322, 339-40 (D. Del. 2017) (explaining that third-party releases are equivalent to
adjudications on the merits, including when private rights are released). ContraIn re Millennium Lab
Holdings II, LLC, 575 B.R. 252, 273, 277-78, 282, 291, 294, 296 (Bankr. D. Del. 2017) (finding that
third party releases can be finally determined by a bankruptcy judge for a number of reasons including
that they are federal claims, they are necessarily resolved as part of claims allowance process, and they
stem from the bankruptcy itself as part of confirmation); In re Charles St African Methodist Episcopal
Church, 499 B.R. 66, 99 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2013) (asserting that third-party releases granted as part of
2M
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rights-the type of rights at issue in Northern Pipelineand Stern-and they are not
subject to de novo review-the standard of review in Executive Benefits and
Raddatz.275
Taken together, Northern Pipeline and Stern teach that appellate review is not
sufficient to allow a bankruptcy judge to issue a final judgment on a private right
without litigant consent. This conclusion undermines the appellate review theory's
core premise and its explanatory power. Shorn of its central proposition, the appellate
review theory's apparent promise as the key to unlock equitable mootness is only
imagined.
iii. Public Rights Theory
The public rights exception is a more popular explanation for bankruptcy courts'
ability to enter final judgements. 276 Adherents argue that Congress established
specific bankruptcy matters pursuant to the Code that only exist by Congress' will
and benefit the public collectively. 277 As a result, Congress can set any level of
appellate review by an Article III judge, including none at all. 27 8 In the context of
equitable mootness, if confirmation and the approval of transactions are public
rights, then a 279
loss of appellate review does not pose any constitutional concerns; it is
unnecessary.
Commentators continue to debate the origins of the public rights exception but
the most popular views derive the doctrine from the federal government's sovereign
immunity and the distinction between individual (private) rights and collective
(public) rights.28 o When the federal government is a defendant, the defiult result is
dismissal of the action based on the sovereign immunity of the federal
government. 281 The action will only proceed to the merits if the federal government
waives its sovereign immunity. 28 Allowing Congress to select the adjudicator over

confirmation ofa plan of reorganization are public rights even if the underlying claims released are private
rights).
27s Wellness Int'l, 135 S. Ct. at 1939, 1958 ("No one hcrc challcngcs the constitutionality ofmagistrate
judges or disputes that they, like bankruptcy judges, may issue reports and recommendations that are
reviewed dc novo by Article III judges.") (Roberts, CJ., dissenting); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S.
664, 674, 676, 682 (1980).
m See, e.g., In re Linear Elec. Co., 852 F.3d 313, 319-20 (3d Cir. 2017); Scott v. Am. See. Ins. Co.
(In re Scott), 572 B.R. 492, 518 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017); West v. Freedom Med., Inc. (In re Apex Long
Term Acute Care-Katy, L.P.), 465 B.R. 452, 458-60 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011); David P. Currie,
Bankruptcy Judges and the Independent Judiciay, 16 CREIGHTON L REv. 441, 452 (1983).
m See supra notes 270-273 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' power to create tribunals).
See Peter L Strauss, The Place ofAgencies in Government: Separation ofPowers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 632 (1984).
m See In re Charles St Church, 499 B.R. at 99.
mSee, e.g., Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHA Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442,455 n. 13 (1977); Loveridge
v. Hall (In re Renewable Energy Dev. Corp.), 792 F.3d 1274, 1278-79 (10th Cir. 2015).
a See Graninanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 67-68 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
m Id at 68. Unlike the states' Elevnth Amendment sovereign immunity, federal sovereign immunity
cannot be impliedly waived. See Bilger v. United States, No. CIV F 00-6486 OWWJLO, 2001 WL
169568, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2001).
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such an action does not create separation of powers concerns because the very
existence of the action is contingent upon Congressional grace.28 3 Another possible
genesis of the public rights exception is that life, liberty and property "belong to
individuals inalienably" and can only be taken by an order issued by an Article Ell
judge.2 ' In contrast, "additional legal interests may be generated by positive law and
belong to the people as a civic community and disputes about their scope and
application may be resolved through other means, including legislation or executive
decision." 285 Irrespective of its origins, the initial interpretation of the public rights
exception was narrow-it only encompassed actions where the federal government
was a party,"' including agency adjudications. 28
Bankruptcy is usually a contest between private parties, and even when the
government is a creditor, it competes on the same playing field as other similarly
situated creditors.288 It does not naturally fit within the public rights exception.
Northern Pipeline confirmed this conclusion as "a matter of public rights must at a
minimum arise 'between the government and others.'"' Yet, later in the opinion,
the Court appeared to reconsider this definitive statement and left open the possibility
that the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations is a public right (presumably, even
when only private parties are involved). 29
In enacting the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984
("BAFJA"),291 Congress attempted to categorize some bankruptcy matters-core

proceedings-as public rights. 29 The link between core claims and public rights is a
syllogism based upon language found in the Northern Pipeline plurality opinion.
Recall, the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations "may well be a public right."29
The Court also categorized it as the "core of the federal bankruptcy power." 29 Based
on this language, Congress tried to establish fundamental bankruptcy matters-core
proceedings-and signal that they are public rights. Section 157(bX2) of Title 28 of
the U.S. Code provides a non-exhaustive list of core proceedings, including many

m Stem v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 488-89 (2011); Graqfinanciera,492 U.S. at 52; Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853-54 (1986).
m Loveridge, 792 F.3d at 1278; see also Wellness Intl Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932,1965
(2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
m Loveridge, 792 F.3d at 1278.
m See N. Pipeline Const Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 n.23 (noting that the
presence ofthe United States as a party was necessary but not sufficient fbr an action to be a public right).
' See, e.g., Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHA Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442,450 n.7 (1977); Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50-51 (1932).
m Currie, supra note 276, at 452; see also Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 571-74 (1947)
(holding that the filing of a proof of claim constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity putting the federal
government on the same footing as other litigants), supersededby statute, An Act to Establish a Uniform
law on the Subject of Bankruptcies, Pub. L. No. 95-598, Title 1, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
m N. Pipeline,458 U.S. at 69 (quoting Er parteBakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438,452 (1929)).
m See id at 71.
2' Pub. L No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28
U.S.C.).
m See In re Rheuban, 128 B.R. 551, 563-M4 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991); Earle Indus., Inc. v. Bond Gen.
Contracting, Inc. (In re Earle Indus., Inc.), 71 B.R. 919, 921 n.4, 924-25 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
m N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 71.
2 Id at 71.
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bedrock bankruptcy matters such as the claims allowance process, determinations of
discharge, and turnover of property. 295 Core proceedings are reviewable under usual
appellate rules,29 not the de novo review required by NorthernPipeline for private
rights.2 Consequently, they must fit within an exception to Article III to allow their
final determination by a bankruptcy judge. 29 In contrast, if a matter is only "related
to" the bankruptcy case, it is a non-core claim. The matter is subject to de novo
review on appeal, following a report and recommendation issued by a bankruptcy
judge. 299
Shortly following the enactment of BAFJA, a pair of Supreme Court opinions
provided further support for categorizing core proceedings were public rights. In
Thomas v. Union Carbide AgriculturalProducts Co., the Court shifted from the
course plotted by its opinion in Northern Pipeline and expanded the public rights
exception to a cause of action between two private parties created by a federal
statue.' Building on Thomas, the majority in Commodities Futures Trading
Commission v. Schor, made the next natural expansion of the public rights doctrine:
a common law action between two parties incorporated into a regulatory
framework."o' Following Thomas and Schor, many courts believed that core
proceedings under BAFJA were public rights.2
The Supreme Court reversed course again in its opinions in GranfinancieraS.A.
v. Nordberg and Stern v. Marshall by embracing a historical formalism echoing
Northern Pipeline. In both cases, the Court held that even though certain actions are
core proceedings, this Congressional delineation does not make them public
rights.o3 Notwithstanding Congress' classification of fraudulent transfers as public

28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (2012).
' Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462,474-75 (2011).
m See N. Pqeine, 458 U.S. at 71-72, 79.
2 C.f Brubaker, sqpra note 231, at 39 (2016) (explaining that the Supreme Court has yet to uphold
a final judgment by a bankruptcy judge without litigant consent as a recognized exception to Article Ill
adjudication).
2
28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9033; see also Chi. Bank of Commerce v. Amalgamated
2

Tr. & Say. Bank (In re Mem'1 Estates, Inc.1 90 B.R. 886, 894 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988).
m Thomas v. Union Carbide Agr. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 588-90 (1985).
a Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 844, 852-55 (1986); see also Stern,
564 U.S. at 491-92 (analyzing the Schor decision).

m See, e.g., Associated Grocers of Neb. Coop., Inc. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. (In re Associated
Grocers of Neb. Coop., Inc.), 62 B.R. 439, 445 (D. Neb. 1986); England v. Fortune Sys. Corp. (In re
Visidata Corp.), 84 B.R. 673, 680 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1988).
' See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462,487,493 (2011); Granfinanciera S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S.

33, 61 (1989). In Grafinanciera,die Chapter 11 Trustee's fiaudulent transfer claim was brought against
a non-creditor who demanded a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution. As core
proceedings, fraudulent transfers not only can be finally determined by a bankruptcy judge but no Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial exists. However, "the right to a jury trial is narrower than the right to
Article Ill adjudication because the right to ajury trial does not attach to a core equitable action, but a
core equitable action will still require Article III adjudication if it does not satisfy either prong of the Stern
test" Robert Miller, FleshingOut the Skeleton: Defining the Prongs of Stern v. Marshall, 11 DEPAUL
Bus. & COM. L.J. 1, 17, 19 (2012). Even though they are not exactly the same inquiry, if a matter is a
public right, it can be adjudicated by a non-article III judge and the Seventh Amendment jury trial right
need not attach. G. Ray Warner, Rotten to the "Core": An Essay on Juries, Jurisdiction and
Granfinanciera, 59 UMKC L. REv. 991,1021 (1991).
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rights (via their categorization as core proceedings by 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)), the
Granfinancieramajority employed a historical analysis to examine the roots of
fraudulent transfers.3 " Fraudulent transfers have long been cognizable outside of
bankruptcy cases as a creditors' remedy. Indeed, an actual fraudulent transfer does
not require insolvency, the usual precondition for a bankruptcy filing.3 5 Due to their
roots independent of bankruptcy cases and their goal of augmenting the estate when
brought in a bankruptcy case, fraudulent transfers are private rights comparable to
the breach of contract action in Northern Pipeline.'" Justice Brennan, the author of
the plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline and the majority in Granfinanciera,
retreated from his comments in NorthernPipelineand not only failed to confirm that
any bankruptcy matters are public rights but noted significant criticism of such
classification fo
In Stern v. Marshall, the Supreme Court similarly failed to label a core
proceeding, this time a counterclaim against a creditor, as a public right. The Court
considered the proceeding not just analogous but equivalent to those in Northern
30
Although Granfinancierahad already clarified that
Pipeline and Granfinanciera.
classifying an action as a core proceeding was not sufficient to make the action a
public right, the filing of defendant's proof of claim represented a distinction from
Northern Pipeline and Granfinanciera.Previous cases had allowed bankruptcy
judges to finally determine private right claims against defendants who had filed
proofs of claim.30o Neither of those cases, however, even mentioned the public rights
exception, much less made the filing of a proof of claim sufficient to trigger it. Both
rested on the private rights being determined as part of the claims allowance
process. 310 Consistent with this precedent, the Stern majority explained that a
bankruptcy court can finally determine an action if it "stems from the bankruptcy
itself or would necessarily be resolved in the claims allowance process." 31' No
mention of the public rights doctrine there, and no confirmation anywhere in the
opinion that any bankruptcy matter is a matter of public rights.31 2 Following Stern,

a Granfmanciera, 492 U.S. at 42-43.
' See, e.g., Anderson v. Michaelson, 127 F. Appx. 253, 256 (9th Cir. 2005); Scottsdale Ins. Co. v.
Tolliver, No. 04-CV-0227-CVE-FI-M, 2012 WL 1581605, at *4 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 4, 2012); Liberty
Mut Ins. Co. v. Hoge, No. C 03-02502 WHA, 2005 WL 756568, at *4 (N.D. Cal. April 1, 2005); Miller
v. Dutil (In re Total Containment, Inc.), No. 04-13144F, 2005 WL 6522761, at *16 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Oct.
18,2005).
0 Granfmanciera, 492 U.S. at 56.
3 Id at 56 n. I1.
N Stem v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462,487 (2011).
' Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42,45 (1990) (per curiam); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323,325,
340(1966).
310
See Langenkamp, 498 U.S. at 44-45; Katchen, 382 U.S. at 333-35 . Indeed, Katchen expressly
stated that it was not determining if a common law cause of action could be decided absent the claims
allowance process. Id at 332-33 n.9 ("As this is the basis of our decision, we obviously intimate no
opinion concerning whether the referee has summary jurisdiction to adjudicate a demand by the trustee
for affirmative relief, all of the substantial factual and legal bases for which have not been disposed of in
passing on objections to the claim.").
" Stern, 564 U.S. at 499.
3 12
See id at 492 n.7.
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core proceedings that could not be finally determined by bankruptcy judges became
known as Stern claims.3 13 In spite of these repeated failures to classify bankruptcy
matters as public rights,'3 14 some courts and commentators have continued to rely
upon Thomas and Schor for support when characterizing various bankruptcy matters
as public rights, including disputes resolved pursuant to the confirmation of plans of
reorganization that could be subject to equitable mootness. 315
If these courts are correct and no Article III involvement is required for the
adjudication of public rights, the lack of Article Ill review resulting from equitable
mootness is immateriaL "[T]he whole point of the 'public rights' analysis was that
no judicial involvement at all was required-executive determination alone would
suffice."' Although this conclusion is seemingly obvious, the Supreme Court has
not confirmed it. Instead, in Northern Pipeline it "suggested that [Congress] may be
required to provide[] for Art. III judicial review."" As a result, even if certain
bankruptcy matters are categorized as public rights, equitable mootness still violates
appellants' constitutional rights by foreclosing Article III appellate review.318
B. HistoricRights
The historic boundaries of bankruptcy commissioners bound modem bankruptcy
judges' ability to enter final judgments and designate the required scope of appellate
review. Bankruptcy courts existed at common law and were established under federal
law shortly after the Framing of the Constitution.' The authority of these courts is
not simply an artifact of history. As recognized by Northern Pipeline,
Granfinanciera, and Stern,3 2o the authority of the bankruptcy commissioners at
common has established the frontier for the constitutional authority of bankruptcy
courts to enter final judgments.321 Rather than rely upon the questionable public
rights exception to delineate the amount of appellate review, this historical inquiry

so See Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct 2165, 2168 (2014).
314 Loveridge v. Hall (In re Renewable Energy Dev. Corp.), 792 F.3d 1274, 1282
(10th Cir. 2015)
("[D]cspitc suggesting some aspects of bankruptcy implicate only public rights, precisely none of the
Court's Article Ill bankruptcy cases has yet upheld a bankruptcy court's decision on this basis.").
3 See, e.g., JPMCC 2007-CIBC 19 East Greenway, LLC v. Bataa/Kierland LLC (In re
BataafKierland LLC), 496 B.R. 183, 188-189 (D. Ariz. 2013) (explaining that the bankruptcy court has
authority to decide contractual dispute in the context of plan confirmation under the "public rights"
exception).
6 Strauss, supra note 278, at 632 (emphasis removed).
" N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 70 n.23 (1982) (citing Atlas
Roofing Co. v. OSHA Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442,455 n.13 (1977)).
3 'is conclusion is particularly important in the Third Circuit, where many high-profile bankruptcy
appeals are brought (due to it including the District of Delaware), which has recognized claims that arise
under federal bankruptcy laws as public rights. See, e.g., In re Linear Elec. Co., 852 F.3d 313, 320 (3d
Cir. 2017).
319 See Wcllncss Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct 1932, 1951-52 (2015) (Roberts, CJ.,
dissenting).
3
1 See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
32i Wellness Int'l, 135 S. Ct at 1970 (Thomas, J., dissenting). One of the newer members of the
Supreme Court, Justice Gorsuch, has at least recognized this perspective. See Loveridge v. Hall (In re
Renewable Energy Dev. Corp.), 792 F.3d 1274, 1282 (10th Cir. 2015).
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follows a worn path. Indeed, Justice Thomas took this path to its logical end. the
appellate review provided to litigants must match that provided contemporaneously
with the Framing. 322 At that time, determinations by bankruptcy commissioners (the
predecessors to today's bankruptcy judges) were subject to appellate review by the
Chancellor in England and by the district court under the 1800 Bankruptcy Act. This
subpart discusses this history and its impact on the constitutionality of equitable
mootness.
From Marathon, to Stern, to the dissents of Chief Justice Roberts and Thomas in
Wellness, the historic theory of bankruptcy court authority emerges. The
constitutional authority of bankruptcy judges is predicated upon the authority of
English and American bankruptcy commissioners at the time of the Framing of the
Constitution. In Northern Pipeline, Justice Rehnquist's majority-making
concurrence explained that a bankruptcy judge could not adjudicate an action "for
breach of contract, misrepresentation, and other counts which are the stuff of the
traditional actions at common law tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789.",323
This statement rephrases the famous dicta of Murray's Lessee: Congress may not
"withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject
of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty." 324 The majority in Stern
confirmed this historical limitation was not altered by the enactment of BAFJA to
replace the Reform Act. 325 Meanwhile, in his concurrence, Justice Scalia began
fleshing out the historic limitation by linking it to the historical practices applied
under the 1800 Bankruptcy Act,3 2 6 which had copied the contemporary English
327
substance and procedure.
In Wellness InternationalLtd v. Shar#, the dissenting opinions of Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Thomas continued the trajectory of Marathon and Stern. While
the majority in Wellness held that litigant consent and forfeiture could be sufficient
to allow a bankruptcy judge to issue final judgments on Stern claims,12 1 the dissents
analyzed the boundaries of Stern claims. Both dissents adopted the historical
jurisdiction of bankruptcy commissioners at common law and under early United
States bankruptcy legislation as the boundary for the constitutional authority of
contemporary bankruptcy judges. According to the Chief Justice: 'This historical
practice, combined with Congress's constitutional authority to enact bankruptcy
laws, confirms that Congress may assign to non-Article III courts adjudications
involving 'the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations, which is at the core of the

mSee Wellnes Int'l, 135 S. Ct at 1970 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 at 90 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
m Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272,284 (1856).
m Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462,484 (2011).
See Id at 505 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Thomas E. Plank, Why Bankruptcy Judges Need Not
and Should Not Be Article III Judges, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 567, 607-609 (1998)).
3 Plank, supranote 326, at 607-09.
31 Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1942 n.7 (2015). The majority did not
analyze whether the relevant claim was a Stern claim or provide any guidance for making such a
determination. See id
3
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federal bankruptcy power."'329 Justice Thomas echoed the Chief Justice's analysis
and extended it to its natural conclusion: as a historical exception to Article III,
Congress may "establish bankruptcy courts that exercise jurisdiction akin to that of
bankruptcy commissioners in England, subject to review traditionally had in
England."'" This is the terminus of the route charted by Marathon, Stern, and
Murray's Lessee. We must survey the right to appeal the commissioners' decisions
at common law and under the 1800 Bankruptcy Act to provide a reference for
comparison to modern practices.
At common law, the Lord Chancellor appointed bankruptcy commissionerS 331
who exercised in rem jurisdiction over the debtor's property. 332 As a precondition for
distributing the liquidated proceeds of the debtor's property, the commissioners
adjudicated the validity of creditors' claims.333 The commissioners' jurisdiction was
limited to in rem determinations concerning property properly in the custody of the
commissioner or his representative, the assignee. 3 1 This authority was not advisory;
final judgments entered by the commissioners were subject to appellate review.335
The commissioners' jurisdiction did not extend to all bankruptcy matters. The
assignees brought actions in the courts of law and equity to recover debts owed to
the debtor or recover the debtor's property.33" The Commissioners could not
adjudicate these actions because they invoked in personam jurisdiction by imposing
liability on third parties.337
Appellate review of commissioners' decisions was available as a right at common
law. An unsatisfied bankrupt or creditor could obtain direct review of the

- Id at 1951 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting N. Pipeline Const Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. at 71, 102 (1982)). The ChiefJustice further relied upon the 1898 Bankruptcy Act because of its
similarities to the jurisdiction of commissioners at common law. The summary jurisdiction of bankruptcy
referees under the 1898 Act was predicated upon property being in customia legis of the court based upon
the debtor's actual or constructive possession, just like the commissioner's jurisdiction at common law.
See Id at 1952-54.
a Id at 1970 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
* Five commissioners were selected to conduct the proceedings and a quorum of three was necessary
to determine almost all issues. Plank, supra note 327, at 576.
n Brubaker, supra note 239, at 263-64.

' Clarke v. Capron (1795) 30 Eng. Rep. 832; 2 Ves. Jun. 667. In Clarke, the assignees (equivalent
of a modem bankruptcy trustc) appealed an allowance of a creditor's claim after the commissioncr had
awarded a dividend. The award of a dividend fimctioned as a default judgment against the assignees. The
assignees attempted to appeal by filing a bill ofequity rather than petition. Id at 832-33. The Chancellor
refused to entertain the appeal because the use ofthe bill was improper. The assignees should have timely
filed a petition. Due to their procedural failure, the appeal was dismissed. Although at first blush Clarke
may appear to support equitable mootness based on the discretionary dismissal by the Chancellor, the case
is properly read as requiring an appropriate mode of appeal. See id at 833 (noting that timely appeal via
petition should have been easily accomplished); see also Plank, supra note 327, at 595 (evaluating
Clarke).
3' Ezra H. Cohen, The Effect ofStern v. Marshall on Avoidance Actions, 22 NORTON J. BANKR. L.
& PRAC. (2013).
m See Brubaker, supra note 239, at 263-64; See John C. McCoid, II, Right to Jury Trial in
Bankruptcy: Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 15, 30-31 (1991).
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commissioners' decision by filing a petition for review by the Lord Chancellor.338
No second level right to an appeal existed for a petition.33 1 If the matter was
particularly difficult, a bill in equity or an action at law could be brought to
collaterally attack the commissioners' decision prior to a dividend being declared for
creditors.' Not only would such a strategy allow a more formal mode of
adjudication, it would also preserve a right to appeal the Chancellor's decision."
Regardless of the chosen mode of appeal, the direct authority of the Chancellor over
the commissioners warranted a right to appeaL342 "An appeal lies to [the Chancellor]
from all [the commissioners'] decisions, and all their proceedings are subject to his
revision."

343

"

The first Federal bankruptcy statute, the Bankruptcy Act of 1800," copied the
contemporary English system of appeal for bankruptcy matters.' Among the many
elements it retained was the initial adjudication by commissioners, however, it
provided for a simpler single right of appeal to an Article III district court judge. 3
Just like in England, the district court judges' authority over the commissioners

3 Exparte Bowes (1798) 31 Eng. Rep. 86,87,90-91; 4 Ves. Jun. 168, 170, 176-77; see also Plank,
supra note 326, at 576-77; Exparte Bryant (1812) 35 Eng. Rep. 83, 83; 1 V & B 211, 211 (stating no
second level right to an appeal existed from the decision ofthe Chancellor on a petition.).
m See ExparteBryant, 35 Eng. Rep. at 83; Murphy v. Felice (In re Felice), 480 B.R. 401,420 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 2012) (citing I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMETARIES *821).
SEx parte Linthwaite (1809) 33 Eng. Rep. 973; 16 Ves. Jun. 234; see also In re Sand, 21 F. Cas.
333, 335-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1822) (No. 12,302) (analyzing jurisdiction of Chancellor).
' See Exparte Cawkwell (1812) 34 Eng. Rep. 505; 19 Ves. Jun. 234; In re Sand, 21 F. Cas. at 336.
In any case, the mode of appeal did not impact the breadth or type of relief available. Id ("In cycry case
[the Chancellor] can give the same relief upon a petition as upon a bill filed"). The more formal
alternatives to review by petition, however, carried some risk. Ifthe difficulties were not sufficient or the
filing was made after a dividend was declared, the bill or action might be dismissed as a waste of time and
estate resources. See Clarke v. Capron (1795) 30 Eng. Rep. 832; 2 Ves. Jun. 667.
3 42
In re Sand, 21 F. Cas. at 336.
* The Bankruptcy Act of 1800 was enacted in response to the national depression of 1798. Vincent
L Leibell, Jr., The ChandlerAct-Its Effect Upon the Law ofBankruptcy, 9 FoRDHAM L. REv. 380, 382
(1940). Certainly, the most famous debtor under the act was Robert Morris, a founding father and signer
of both the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. His case provided one of the few reported
opinions analyzing the 1800 Bankruptcy Act. See In re Morris, 17 F. Cas. 785, 786 (W.D. Pa 1837) (No.
9,825).
s See Plank, supra note 327, at 573. Indeed, the 1800 Act was so similar that contemporary English
bankruptcy precedents were viewed as precedential. See Roosevelt v. Mark, 6 Johns. Ch. 266, 285 (N.Y.
Ch. 1822) ("The bankrupt act of the United States, of April, 1800, was a consolidation of the previous
provisions in the English statutes of bankruptcy; and the English decisions on their statutes prior to that
date, properly apply as rules of construction to this act of Congress."). 5 Geo. 2, c. 30, § 1 (1732) was the
English bankruptcy statute in effect during the American Revolution, through the passage of 1800
Bankruptcy Act. Stephen J. Lubben, A New Understandingof the Bankruptcy Clause, 64 CASE W. RES.
L REv. 319,337 n.85 (2013).
m See In re Morris, 17 F. Cas. at 788; Plank, supra note 327, at 609. Courts disagreed over whether
a further right to appeal from a district court existed. Compare In re Sand, 21 F. Cas. at 336, 339 (noting
no right to appeal from district court review of commissioners' determination and noting existence of
opinion of Justice Livingston, riding the circuit, coming to same conclusion) with Lucas v. Morris, 15 F.
Cas. 1063, 1065 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1825) (No. 8,587) (stating circuit court possessed some jurisdiction to
hear appeals from district court).
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formed the basis for the right to appeal.347 More fundamentally, if this right did not
exist, one district court questioned: "Who is to recall the commission?-the authority
which is thus abused, which every one[sic] must agree ought to be recalled by
somebody?"
The parallels to today's system of bankruptcy adjudication are telling. The
constitutional bounds of bankruptcy adjudication are established by the limitations
on the commissioners at common law and under the 1800 Bankruptcy Act, including
the associated right of appeal." Modernly, this is the right to appeal to an Article III
judge. BAFJA satisfies this historical requirement by providing Article III appellate
review of bankruptcy court judgments as a matter of right.3 50 It is initially available
as a first level appeal to the district court" but further review as a matter of right is
available to the Court of Appeals. 352 Discretionary review by the Supreme Court via
a writ of certiorari is possible.35 3
Equitable mootness unconstitutionally abridges the right to Article III appellate
review. It prevents an Article III judge from reviewing an Article I bankruptcy
judge's final determination.3 ' Even though the Article III Judge is making the
prudential decision to not hear the merits of the appeal, the right to appellate review
was recognized at common law and it must be provided.3 ' No evidence exists that
the English legislature at common law or Congress, at the time of the Framing, has
ever sanctioned equitable mootness. Indeed, the evidence suggests the opposite. The
right to review and supersede the commissioners was necessary to uphold the
bankruptcy laws. 3 5 6 "[I]f he has no authority to supersede his commission, the

4 In re Morris, 17 F. Cas. at 794.
M~ Id

m See Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1970 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
In re One2One Commc'ns, LLC, 805 F.3d 428, 446 (3d Cir. 2015) (Krausc, J., concurring) ("[TJhe
decisions of bankruptcy commissioners, referees, and, most recently, judges have always been subject to
review in courts of law or equity."). "From the nature of preconstitutional bankruptcy adjudication
emerges a general principle: The details of bankruptcy adjudication are a matter of legislative discretion
requiring only a right of appeal to a court of law or equity." Plank, supra note 327, at 574. Although
Professor Plank employed this conclusion as evidence of the appellate review theory and a critique of the
conclusions first reached in Northern Pipeline and later reiterated in Stern, it also illustrates the necessity
of appellate review based on historical practice.
- See In re Machne Menachem, Inc., 371 B.R. 63, 75 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2006) (Deciding not to apply
equitable mootness to a motion for reconsideration, explaining that "[a]ppellate review by an Article III
Judge is a fundamental pillar of our jurisdictional grant").
a The appellant can always choose to appeal to the district court rather than a bankruptcy appellate
panel, even when one is available. See 28 U.S.C. § 158 (2012).
m 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2XA) (2012).
3 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2012).
3
- In re One20ne, 805 F.3d at 445 (Krause, J., concurring).
3` The Supreme Court has provided contrary guidance. See id at 446. Indeed, equitable mootness
has never been confirmed by the Supreme Court and it might be on shaky ground if it is reviewed by the
current Court. Then-Judge Alito heavily criticized the doctrine when he sat on the Third Circuit In re
Cont'1 Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 567-73 (3d Cir. 1996) (en bane) (Alito, J., dissenting).
3
In re Morris, 17 F. Cas. 785, 788 (W.D. Pa. 1837) (No. 9,825). When petitioned to review the
determination of the commissioners, the Chancellor at common law and each district court judge under
the 1800 Bankruptcy Act "takes care that the true intentions of the legislature in making the statutes, as
he understands them, shall be carried into effect, and shall not be perverted." See id at 793.
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mischief will go on; and I know of no remedy for it."3 s7 If an appeal is dismissed
pursuant to equitable mootness, the mischief will continue because the merits have
not been adjudicated and the appellant is left without a remedy.
The constitutional concerns presented by equitable mootness are further
exacerbated by the bankruptcy judge's control over many of the factors comprising
the equitable mootness inquiry."' Returning to the time of the Framing, the
Chancellor's and district court's control over the commissioners was
comprehensive.s' Although it was rooted in the right to appeal, the control extended
to the right to supersede the commission.W" BAFJA modernly reflects this spirit of
control through the district court's authority to withdraw the reference from the
bankruptcy court over any case or proceeding, and the district court's ability to limit
the bankruptcy court's authority by order."' Indeed, these provisions were enacted
in response to Northern Pipeline and more limited supervisory authority under the
unconstitutional Reform Act.2 Equitable mootness turns the tables and "effectively
delegates the power to prevent that review to the very non-Article HI tribunal whose
decision is at issue."3 6 3
Although Article II judges decide whether an appeal is equitably
moot, bankruptcy courts control nearly all of the variables in the equation,
including whether a reorganization plan is initially approved, whether a

stay of plan implementation is granted, whether settlements or releases
crucial to a plan are approved and executed, whether property is

transferred, whether new entities (in which third parties may invest) are
formed, and whether distributions (including to third parties) under the
plan begin-all before plan challengers reach an Article III court'

-

This virtual role reversal with the bankruptcy court controlling the adjudication
by the district court violates the separation of powers and independently supports the
unconstitutionality of equitable mootness. 6

3 7

Id at 795.
re One2One, 805 F.3d at 445 (Krause, J., concurring).
3" In re Morris, 17 F. Cas. at 794-95; In re Sand, 21 F. Cas. 333, 335-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1822) (No.
12,302) ("[Iln virtue of his power to appoint and to remove, to create and to annihilate these officers, [the
Chancellor] possesses the authority to control and direct them in all their acts, and thus effectually to
exercise the whole jurisdiction. It would be very difficult, and not necessary, to enumerate the very various
instances in which his jurisdiction is said to be derived from his superintending authority over the
commissioners.").
In re Morris, 17 F. Cas. at 794-95; In re Sand, 21 F. Cas. at 335.
a Land-O-Sun Dairies, Inc. v. Fla. Supermarkets, Inc. (In re Finevest Foods, Inc.), 143 BR. 964,
968 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157 (2012)); see also Brief for Petitioner at 42, Oil
States Energy Scrvs., LLC v. Greene's Energy Grp., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1365 (2018) (No. 16-712) (citing
withdrawal of the reference as a mechanism for district courts to exercise control over bankruptcy courts).
This was also true under the 1898 Act See N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S.
50, 79-80 n.31 (1982).
- See Land-O-Sun, 143 B.R. at 968.
m One2One, 805 F.3d at 445 (Krause, J., concurring).
sId
~'See Brubaker, supra note 231, at 33 n.86.
-
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The necessity of appellate review brings the constitutionality of sections
363(m) and 364(e) into question.' Although sections 363(m) and 364(e) have the
added imprimatur of Congressional enactment, they both accomplish the same ends
as equitable mootness."6 Stern, Granfinanciera,and Northern Pipelineall teach that
legislative enactment is not sufficient to overcome constitutional infirmities." No
parallel enactments were present contemporaneous with the Framing. As a result, the
constitutionality of these sections, like that of equitable mootness, is also doubtful 369
VI. EXPANDED STAY PENDING APPEAL TEST

Equitable mootness' popularity compared to other prudential doctrines illustrates
the importance of the policy concerns supporting the doctrine. Although the
principles bounding the constitutional authority of bankruptcy courts and appellate
rights arising from their judgments are tethered to the standards of 1789 and 1800,
the economic realities of modem bankruptcy differ markedly from that earlier era.
The perceived need for equitable mootness reflects these immense changes.
Expanding the stay pending appeal test constitutionally effectuates the policies
supporting equitable mootness. The appropriate reaction to equitable mootness'
unconstitutionality is not to shun the policy supporting equitable mootness; it is to
repackage these concerns in a constitutional form that does not ignore the merits of
the appeaL Equitable mootness is the outgrowth of the stay pending appeal test370
resulting from bankruptcy's unique impact on non-party interests.37 ' By altering the
test for stay pending appeal to include consideration of non-parties' interests, it
assesses equitable mootness's raison d'etre without its unconstitutional infirmities,
while still preliminarily evaluating the merits. Momentum is already building toward
this conclusion. 31 Modifying the test will also have the ancillary benefit of
evaluating these concerns in other bankruptcy contexts, such as appeals of orders
under sections 363(m) and 364(e).
The test for stay pending appeal leaves room for evaluating the impact of staying
the appeal on third parties. Although the Supreme Court has blessed the test for stay
pending appeal, it has not rigidly defined the test's factors.3" This flexibility leaves

'" See supra Part IV (discussing 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(m) and 364(e) (2012)).
' See Weingarten Nostat, Inc. v. Serv. Merch. Co., 396 F.3d 737, 742-44 (6th Cir. 2005) ("Though
reflective of the general prohibition against advisory opinions undergirding the constitutional mootness
doctrine, bankruptcy mootness under § 363(m) is broader. Even ifthe appeal is not moot as a constitutional
matter because a court could provide a remedy, the policy favoring finality in bankruptcy sales reflected
in § 363(m) requires that certain appeals nonetheless be treated as moot absent a stay.").
m See supra Section VI.C.
3"
Alla Raykin, Section 363 Sales: Mooting Due Process?, 29 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 91, 134 (2012)
(questioning whether § 363(m) is unconstitutional based on its elimination of the opportunity to be heard
on appeal).
' As we saw in Part I, the historical lineage of equitable mootness evolved from the traditional stay
pending appeal framework.
m See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
mSee supra note 39 and accompanying text.
'See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433-436 (2009).
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room for individualized applications. 374 Courts commonly describe the test's third
factor as the balance of the harms. 3 " It evaluates "whether issuance of the stay will
substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding" and compares this
harm to the potential harm to the appellant arising from a failure to establish a stay.376
Traditionally, courts have restricted the evaluation of the harm caused by the stay to
the debtor, L e. the debtor is a melting ice cube and a stay will destroy its chance to
reorganize. 3" Non-parties, however, are often impacted by a bankruptcy appeal; this
is the reason equitable mootness exists." It is therefore particularly proper for a
court analyzing the stay pending appeal in a bankruptcy matter to consider non-party
interests as part of the third prong of the stay pending appeal test.3 Their interests
may even carry sufficient weight to deny a stay and allow plan or transaction to be
consummated.
Unlike equitable mootness, the test for stay pending appeal also evaluates the
likelihood of the appellant prevailing on the merits. An appellant must show that it
has a substantial chance of success on the merits in order to obtain a stay. " Equitable
mootness, in contrast, traditionally lacks any analysis of the merits. This omission
can create an awkward situation where the appellate court may believe that the
appellants have a reasonable chance of success on the merits but they refuse to even
consider them."' In response, recent decisions have (i) briefly considered the merits

* See id
s See, e.g., Beeman v. BGI Creditors' Liquidating Tr. (In re BGI, Inc.) 504 B.R. 754,764 (S.D.N.Y.

2014).
37

Nken 556 U.S. at 426. Courts have also generally considered the "consequences beyond the

immediate parties." In re Revel AC, Inc., 802 F3d 558, 569 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing and quoting Roland
Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 388 (7th Cir. 1984)). However, this inquiry focuses on
the public in general rather than on interested parties in the bankruptcy appeal. See In re Revel, 802 F.3d
at 573.
m See In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 548 B.R. 674, 683 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (potential harms
include "(i) lost strategic opportunities; (ii) difficulty in recruiting and retaining talent for the Debtor, (iii)
incurrence of administrative and professional expenses; (iv) placing plan settlements in jeopardy; and (v)
exposing the equity to be granted to non-moving creditors to market volatility and other risks.").
" See Search Market Direct, Inc. v. Jubber (In re Paige), 584 F.3d 1327, 1339 (10th Cir. 2009);
Wooley v. Faulkner (In re SI Restructuring, Inc.), 542 F.3d 131, 136 (5th Cir. 2008) ("The ultimate
question to be decided is whether the Court can grant relief without undermining the plan and, thereby,
affecting third parties.").
3
See In re Revel, 802 F.3d at 569 (quoting Roland, 749 F.2d at 388); Freeman v. Ow, No. 16-cv04817-IST, 2016 WL 6778667, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16,2016); United Mine Workers of Am. Combined
Benefit Fund v. Walter Energy, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-00064--RDP, 2016 WL 470815, at *7 (N.D. Ala. Feb.
8,2016); BDC Capital., Inc. v. 11Toburn L.P., 508 B.R. 633,640-41 (E.D. Va. 2014).
m Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 968 (9th Cir. 2011).
m See In re Cont'l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 557, 567 (3d Cir. 1996) (describing issues presented by the
appeal as "interesting and challenging" but still finding equitable mootness precludes evaluation of the
merits). Some coutts have found this failing so troubling that they have considered the merits prior to
applying equitable mootness. See Deutsche Bank AG v. Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc. (In re
Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc.), 416 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 2005). However, even in the Second Circuit,
courts are not required to follow this path and consider the merits prior to equitable mootness. In re Sabine
Oil & Gas Corp., No. 16 Civ. 6054 (LAP), 2017 WL 477780, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3,2017).

2018-2019

EQUITABLE MOOTNEss

313

as part of the equitable mootness inquiry3 or (ii) made an equitable mootness
determination contemporaneously with a determination on the merits.' These are
half-measures that only highlight this shortcoming.
As an ancillary benefit, the expanded stay pending appeal test would also
improve the application of statutory mootness provisions of the Code by evaluating
bankruptcy-specific concerns. Bankruptcy appeals, especially those involving a sale
or financing by the debtor, often affect third parties who are not actively involved in
an appeal.'" Recognizing this, some courts evaluating whether to grant a stay
pending appeal of an order where either section 363(m) or 364(e) may moot an
appeal, consider the impact of the stay on non-parties. 385 Many courts, however,
often only consider the interests of the parties to the appeal. 3 The expanded stay
pending appeal test would ensure that third parties' interests are evaluated.
The expanded stay pending appeal test brings the evolution of equitable mootness
full circle. It reflects the concerns that originally birthed the equitable mootness
doctrine but returns the doctrine to constitutionality. Equitable mootness is rooted in
the unfairness of reversal for the third-parties and importance of facilitating
reorganizations. By evaluating this issue in the context of a stay pending appeal, it
will make stays more difficult to obtain and the reorganization of the debtor will be
more likely to continue uninterrupted 3 Meanwhile, the appellant's constitutionally
protected right to appellate review on the merits is not eliminated by judicial
discretion.
CONCLUSION

In an ideal world, Congress would enact a statutory provision establishing
equitable mootness and outline the types of proceedings where it would apply.
Unfortunately, Congressional action does not appear likely. It is especially unlikely
when Congress can rely upon the prudential version as a substitute for its own action.
The continued application of equitable mootness in spite of its many
failings-statutory, equitable, prudential, and constitutional-simply because it is
efficient and useful is improper. A prudential doctrine without a statutory basis where
a judge can eliminate an appeal without even considering the merits simply does not
comport with Supreme Court precedent or the historical nature of bankruptcy court
authority and appellate review. It is time to discard equitable mootness in its current

' Paige, at 1339 (advocating for a "quick look at the merits"); Deutsche Bank, 416 F.3d at 144
("[A]n appraisal of the merits is essential to the framing of an equitable remedy."); see also In re One2One
Commc'ns, LLC, 805 F.3d 428, 454 (3d Cir. 2015) (Krause, J., concurring) (arguing against the vitality
of equitable mootness but suggesting that the Third Circuit adopt this element if equitable mootness is
retained).
m See In ra Peabody Energy Corp., 582 B.R. 771, 779-81, 784 (E.D. Mo. 2017).
T
The unraveling of a sale or financing could easily sabotage a debtor's chances for reorganizing,
thereby injuring all its creditors as well as third-parties who relied upon the sale or financing when
transacting with the debtor.
See In ra Minor, CaseNo. 13-18227,2016 WL 3462068, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio June 17,2016).
See supra note 377 and accompanying text.
* An unstayed appeal also makes constitutional mootness and more limited relief more likely.
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form." 8 Nothing else will spur Congress. Only by coming full circle and abandoning
equitable mootness as a prudential doctrine will Congress enact a constitutional
substitute. In the interim, expanding the stay pending appeal test to weigh the impact
on non-parties of staying a bankruptcy appeal will constitutionally manifest the
concerns at the core of equitable mootness.

m It will take a Supreme Court decision to provide clarity, let alone to eliminate the doctrine. See
Paul A. Avron, Equitable Mootness: Is it Time for the Supreme Court to Weigh in?, Am. Bankr. Inst. J.,
Mar. 2017, at 36.

